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Note

Scienter and Rule 1Ob-5: Development of a New Standard...
the still clouded cauldron in which
the oracles continue the stew ....

I

T HE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 has had extensive impact on public awareness of corporate information, and has un-

questionably provided substantial protection to the investing public.
The anti-fraud provisions of this act, and the regulations promulgated
thereunder, engendered a number of issues material to the determination of the standards for violations. Perhaps the most difficult and
confusing of these issues has been the concept of scienter.
On March 15, 1974 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit for the first time had an opportunity in White v.
Abrams2 to lift the haze which had enveloped its earlier opinions in
Ellis v. Carter3 and Royal Air Properties,Inc. v. Smith.4 After prolonged debate by a number of commentators5 prompted by the court's
ambivalent statements in Ellis and Royal Air Properties concerning
the sufficiency of negligence in meeting the scienter requirement 6 in
an action for damages under rule 10b-5, 7 the court at last clarified

its position. In light of the court's earlier statements on the scienter
issue, its pronouncements came as no surprise. Its methodology for
reaching its conclusions, however, was both startling and extremely
gratifying to those who have urged that the concept of scienter is
both misunderstood and misapplied in the context of 10b-5. 8 The
court stated:

1Lanza

v. Drexel & Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,826, at 90,103 (S.D. N.Y. 1970),
aff'd, 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973) (Judge Frankel).
2495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974).
3291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961).
4312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962).
SSee, e.g., Bucklo, Scienter and Rule 1Ob-5, 67 Nw. U.L. REV. 562, 581-84 (1972); Jennings, Insider Trading in Corporate Securities: A Survey of Hazards and Disclosure Obligations Under Rule lOb-5, 62 Nw. U.L. REV. 809, 817-19 (1968); Mann, Rule lOb-5:
Evolution of a Continuum of Conduct to Replace the Catch Phrases of Negligence and
Scienter, 45 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1206, 1207 (1970). See also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
401 F.2d 833, 855, 868 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
6 No court has yet successfully succeeded in defining "scienter" in usable terminology. Therefore, as it is used in this note, the term will refer to a degree of fault, e.g., intent to defraud, negligence, etc. As such, when considering the issue of negligence versus scienter
sufficient to impute liability, negligence will be referred to as a form of, rather than an
alternative to, scienter.
7 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973).
8See 2 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD § 8.4 (503), at 204.103 (1971) [hereinafter cited as BROMBERG] ("Probably the most important step toward clarifying the law of
scienter would be to ban the word."); Mann, supra note 5, at 1220 ("The lOb-5 cases
are not explainable by attempting to fit them into nebulous legal categories of fraud,
negligence or some degree of scienter.").
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[W] e reject scienter or any other discussion of state of
mind as a necessary and separate element of a 10b-5 action.
The proper standard to be applied is the extent of the duty
that rule 10b-5 imposes on the particular defendant. In
making this determination the court should focus on the
goals of the securities fraud legislation by considering a
number of factors that have been found to be significant in
securities transactions.9
Possibly the most intriguing aspect of this holding is its relationship to the standards posited in a series of cases recently decided
by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.10 In three cases decided in
March and April of 1973, the Second Circuit developed a standard
radically different from any previously stated in its prior opinions
regarding the relationship between scienter and rule 10b-5. Their
new standard was most clearly enunciated by Judge Timbers in Cohen
v. FranchardCorp."
The standard for determining liability under Rule 10b-5
essentially is whether plaintiff has established that defendant either knew the material facts that were misstated
or omitted and should have realized their significance, or
failed or refused to ascertain and disclose such facts when
they were readily available to him and he had reasonable
12
grounds to believe that they existed.
The most obvious similarity between the standards postulated by
the two circuits is the utter lack of reference to scienter. Not so ob13
vious is the dissimilarity in their treatments of the negligence issue.
The elimination of the scienter concept by both circuits comes
after much confusion with the term, its meaning, and its application;
despite this, the move was nevertheless unexpected. The courts' treatments of negligence, however, come as no surprise, the Second Cir-

9 White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 734-35 (9th Cit. 1974).
10Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 910 (1973); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cit. 1973); Cohen v. Franchard Corp., 478 F.2d 115 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973).
11478 F.2d 115 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973).
12

1d. at 123.
13The extent of the controversy over the issue of whether proof of negligence is sufficient for
the imputation of liability under rule 10b-5 is best demonstrated by the volume of commentary devoted to it. See Bucklo, supra note 5; Epstein, The Scienter Requirement in
Actions Under Rule lob-5, 48 N.C.L. REV. 482 (1970); Mann, supra note 5; Note,
Scienter and Rule lOb-5, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 1057 (1969); Note, Proof of Scienter Necessary in a Private Suit Under SEC Anti-Fraud Rule lOb-5, 63 MICH. L. REv. 1070 (1965);
Comment, Outside Director's Liability for Misleading Corporate Statements, 59 CORNELL
L. REV. 728, 737-44 (1974); Comment, Negligent Misrepresentations Under Rule lOb-5,
32 U. CHI. L. REv. 824 (1965).
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cuit having stated repeatedly that it favors a requirement of more
than mere negligence to impute liability under rule 10b-5, 14 and the
Ninth Circuit having long since established that its standard would,
at the very least, include negligence. 15
Several questions arise in comparing these two circuit's analogous and yet widely divergent opinions on the standards for violations of rule 10b-5. Is the passing of the concept of scienter from
the 10b-5 scene necessarily a beneficial measure? Was its meaning
ever really applicable in 10b-5 cases? Should mere negligence be
actionable under the rule? And which of the two standards enunciated by the courts better conforms to the requirements of the rule?
The purpose of this note will be to discuss and, where possible,
to answer these questions. In so doing, it will be necessary to consider the development of scienter in the context of common law
fraud, as well as prior 10b-5 actions; congressional intent with regard
to private actions under the rule; judicial interpretation of this intent; and finally, the four recent cases developing new standards.
Common Law Fraud
The divergent views espoused by the different circuits regarding the proof necessary to impose liability under rule 10b-5 is in no
small part attributable to the confusion surrounding the elements
required to impose liability for fraud or deceit under the common
law. Although the courts have stated repeatedly that the proof needed
to impute liability under 10b-5 is not as stringent as that for common law fraud,1 6 nevertheless reference is quite often made to these
same elements.17 Thus today's courts face the same confusion as their
common law predecessors in attempting to ascertain the precise
standard short of which conduct becomes reprehensible, and ergo,
liability obtains.

Technology Fund, Inc. v. Lionel Corp., 483 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
U.S.
, 94 S.Ct. 1416 (1974); Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d
-----442 (2d Cir. 1971); Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970); Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969); Fischmann v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d
783 (2d Cir. 1951). See text accompanying notes 65-100 infra.

14Republic

"See Royal Air Properties, v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962); Ellis v. Carter, 291
F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961). See also text accompanying notes 59-64 and 101-109 infra.
16Douglass v. Glenn E. Hinton Industries, Inc., 440 F.2d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 1971), specificially stating that the holding of Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961) was that
scienter was unnecessary as an element under rule lOb-5.
17 Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 913 (1970), affirming the lower court's jury verdict for the plaintiff, stating, at 1291:
[TIhe trend is clearly away from enforcing a scienter requirement equal to the
"intent to defraud" required for common law fraud. Before there may be a
violation of the securities acts there need not be present all of the same elements
essential to a common law fraud ....
(Continued on next page)
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At common law, an action for the tort of deceit encompassed the
concept of fraud as an element which had to be proven before damages could be awarded. 18 A contract could be rescinded for an innocent misrepresentation, 19 but if damages were sought it became necessary to prove that the defendant made the false representation
"fraudulently. ' 20 This element of fraud is included in the term
scienter, undoubtedly the most cumbersome concept in common law
22
deceit, 21 which can be defined as defendant's knowledge of his falsity.
But this is not necessarily the only definition that can be attributed to scienter. The elusiveness of the term and its underlying concepts is exemplified by the definition and explanation found in an
early Michigan case, People v. Gould :23
Scienter is not a word of mystery, or magic meaning. It is
merely an expressive word retained from the old Latin forms
of pleading signifying in the connection commonly used that
the alleged crime or tort was done designedly, understandingly, knowingly, or with guilty knowledge. If necessary to
affirmatively negative the supposition of ignorant innocence
under the facts alleged in this information, scienter is plainly
24
apparent.

(Continued from preceding page)
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969) (Judge Waterman giving a liberal view of the intent requirement);
Shemtob v. Shearson Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1971) (reaffirming the necessity of proving scienter in a private damage action).
'8W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 105, at 685-86 (4th ed. 1971), states the elements to
be proven in the tort action of deceit.
1. A false representation made by the defendant. In the ordinary case, this representation must be one of fact.
2. Knowledge or belief on the part of the defendant that the representation is
false - or, what is regarded as equivalent, that he has not sufficient basis of
information to make it. This element often is given the technical name of
1scienter."
3. An intention to induce the plaintiff to act or refrain from action in reliance
upon the misrepresentation.
4. Justifiable reliance upon the representation on the part of the plaintiff, in taking action or refraining from it.
5. Damage to the plaintiff, resulting from such reliance. [citations omitted]
Furthermore, in Cohen v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 444 S.W.2d 498, 505 (Mo.
App. 1969), it is stated that "[tihe rule is firmly established that the existence of a fraudulent intent or an intent to deceive is an indispensable element."
19See BROMBERG, supra note 8, § 8.4 (120), at 204 (1971).
20

M. BIGELOW, THE LAW OF TORTS 87 (8th ed. 1907).

21W.PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 107, at 700-01

(4th ed. 1971)

(termed scienter dif-

ficult of proof and elusive as a matter of psychology).
2 37 AM.JUR. 2d. Fraud & Deceit § 197, at 260-61 (1968).
2' People v. Gould, 237 Mich. 156, 211 N.W. 346 (1926).
2Id. at 164, 211 N.W. at 348-49.
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For those who, upon reading the Gould definition of scienter, still
find the definition not "plainly apparent, ' 25 there are many more
vantage points from which to view this elusive term. It can be referred to as knowledge, 26 guilty knowledge, 27 knowledge with intent
to deceive, 28 such knowledge as charges a person with the consequences of his act, 29 a false representation made with knowledge of
31
its falsity, 30 or simply a fraudulent intent.
Albeit these definitions may ostensibly be confusing, it is important to discern that the prime concern is with the defendant's
state of mind. 32 The courts attempt, on a case by case basis, to cull
25

Id.
2BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1512 (4th ed. 1951).
2 State v. Lisbon Sales Book Co., 176 Ohio St. 482, 485, 200 N.E.2d 590, 593 (1964).
28See BROMBERG,supra note 8, § 8.4 (110), at 203 (1971 ).
2Shriver v. Union Stockyards Nat'l Bank, 117 Kan. 638, 648, 232 P.1062, 1067 (1925).
3037 AM. JuR. 2d, Fraud & Deceit § 197, at 260 (1968).
31Serrano v. Miller & Teasdale Commission Co., 117 Mo. App. 185, 195, 93 S.W. 810, 813
(1906).
32See Epstein, The Scienter Requirement In Actions Under Rule lOb-5, 48 N.C. L. REV. 482,
483 (1970), wherein the author cites and isolates the five possible states of mind of the
defendant as classified by Dean Keeton:
[A) person makes a misrepresentation (1) justifiably convinced of the truth of
the statement, or (2) believing in the truth of the statement but knowing that
he has insufficient knowledge on which to base such a belief, or (3) having no
genuine belief whatsoever in either the truth or the falsity of the statement, or
(4) realizing that the statement was probably false, or (5) convinced of the
falsity of the statement.
See also, Terry, Intent to Defraud, 25 YALE L. J. 87, 90 (1915), wherein the writer discusses, in depth, the various elements of the concept of intent to defraud which, of course,
is determinative of the defendant's state of mind. The statement is made that intent is
made up of seven elements:
A. Intent to make a representation, to convey an idea to another. When the representation is made in words, there is seldom any question as to this element.
But a fraudulent misrepresentation can be made by conduct without words.
In such a case the question may arise, whether the actor really intended that
any one should draw from his conduct any inference as to the existence of
a fact.
B. Intent to address or direct the representation to some one. If a misrepresentation is directed to one person, but comes to another who is deceived by it
and acts upon it to his injury, there is no fraud against the latter. But a representation may be directed to a class of persons and so to each individual of
that class, or even to the whole public, as in the case of a lying advertisement.
C. Intent that the representation bear a certain meaning, amounting the assertion of a certain fact. A representation may be capable of several meanings,
in some of which it may be false and fraudulent and in others not.
D. Knowledge that the representation, in its aforesaid meaning, is false. This,
as has been said, is the element that makes the intent amount to culpable
rather than to mere simple intention.
E. Intent that the addressee shall believe the representation.
F. Intent that he shall act upon it in a certain way.
G. Intent that his so acting upon it shall produce a certain consequence.
33See Miller, Scienter In Deceit and Estoppel, 6 IND. L. J. 152, 157 (1930), in which the
author states that Lord Herschell, in Peek v. Derry, 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889), intimated
that scienter could "be imputed where the Defendant's words reasonably permit the inference that he knows the truth though, in fact, he has no actual knowledge."
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from the defendant's actions, or inactions, the requisite amount of
fraud needed to impose liability. The problem is, of course, that quite
often the defendant's state of mind is not easily determinable. Thus
the courts and the commentators 33 found it necessary to expand the
scienter concept and label that type of fraud which can be proven as
"fraudulent at law," 34 and that type which is not readily observable
as "conclusively presumed" 35 or "imputed." 36 As the late Professor
Pomeroy observed:
It is now a settled doctrine of the law that there can be no
fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment without some moral
delinquency. There is no actual fraud, legal fraud, which is
not also a moral fraud. This immoral element consists in the
necessary guilty knowledge and consequent intent to deceive
sometimes designated by the technical term "scienter."
The very essence of the legal conception is the fraudulent intention flowing from the guilty knowledge. No misrepresentation is fraudulent at law, unless it is made with actual knowledge of its falsity, or under such circumstances that the law
must necessarily impute such knowledge to the party at the
37
time he makes it.
This definition is closely akin to the three methods of proving scienter
discussed in Serrano v. Miller :38
First. A false representation, made with knowledge of its
falsity by the utteror, is scienter in law, and therefore proof
that the party made the false representation concerning a
material fact, with knowledge that the representation was
false at the time it was made, satisfies the law in so far as
scienter is concerned, for, from the fact that the representation was made with knowledge of its falsity, it must be taken
that it was made with an intent to deceive and the corrupt
element or evil design - actual knowledge of its falsity being present, scienter is thereby established. . . . Second.
When a party makes a representation of a material fact as
of his own knowledge, when in truth he has no knowledge
whatever on the subject either of its truth or its falsity ...
the law will constructively supply the scienter because of the
reckless conduct of the utteror for the very good reason that
a positive statement of fact implies knowledge of such fact,

- J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 884, at 450-51
POMEROY).
35

(1907)

(hereinafter cited as

Watson v.Jones, 41 Fla. 241, 247, 25 So. 678, 682 (1899).

3See POMEROY, supra note 34, at 450-51 (1907).
37Id.
3 117 Mo.App. 185, 93 S.W. 810 (1906).
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and, if the party who makes it has no knowledge upon the
subject, he is telling scienter what is untrue- he is affirming his knowledge, when in truth he has no knowledge to
affirm. Third. The law will... constructively supply scienter
when the party, by reason of his peculiar position, has
"special means of knowledge," and . .. makes representations which he ought to have known, if he did not, to be
false.3 9
It is interesting to note that the third definition borders on, and
is probably analogous to, negligence. When a person makes representations which "he ought to have known, if he did not, to be false," the
logical interpretation is that he was negligent. This is a far cry from
the "intent to deceive" in the first definition, but nonetheless it is
one form of common law scienter.
These same three patterns establishing scienter are also discussed in Wheeler v. Baars:4
A false representation made with knowledge of its falsity
made scienter, in technical phrase - affords, if other
elements of liability are present, a right of action in damages. A false representation may be made scienter, in contemplation of law, in any of the following ways: (1) With
actual knowledge of its falsity; (2) with knowledge either
of its truth or falsity; or (3) under circumstances in which
the person making it ought to have known, if he did not
41
know, of its falsity.
-

In Ward v. Trimble,42 the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, in 1898,
found the president of a bank, who sold stock in the bank to the
plaintiff, liable in damages for fraud. The plaintiff, relying on a published statement from the bank regarding its financial condition, contended that the president of the bank misled him because the statement was false and the president should have known it to be false.
The court found it unnecessary to decide if the president had actual
knowledge of the falsity, and held:
For leaving out of view the question whether he did in fact
know the statement was untrue, being in a situation to know,
and where it was his duty to know, he, in contemplation of
law, did know it, and consequently such statement is held to
be fraudulent. 3
39

Id. at

4033

195-97, 93 S.W. at 813.
Fla. 696, 15 So. 584 (1894).

41 Id.

at 710, 15 So. 584, 588, quoting from, 1 BIGELow, FRAUDs 509.

42 103 Ky. L. Rptr. 153, 44 S.W. 450 (Ct. App. 1898).

at 159, 44 S.W. at 452, quoting from, Prewitt v. Trimble, 92 Ky. L. Rptr. 176, 182, 17
S.W. 356, 358 (1891).

4Id.
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Again negligence as a substitute for scienter can be surmised
from Ward, and the list of possible definitions for common law scienter expands. Some are consistent, and some are not, (e.g., intentional versus negligent) and the courts today, by using the term
scienter to establish liability under rule 10b-5, are, quite naturally,
finding the term as difficult to apply as did their common law
predecessors.
Judicial Interpretation of the Scienter Requirement
During the past twenty years, the decisions interpreting the
scienter requirement in the context of a 10b-5 action have been legion.
The Second Circuit has been both the most prolific and the most conservative of all the circuits,4 and consequently, their recent pronouncements on the issue harbor substantial import. Conversely, even
though the Ninth Circuit has long been at the opposite end of the
spectrum, 45 its recent declarations concerning the test for determining violations of rule 10b-5 must also be accorded great weight. Thus,
this section will be concerned primarily with cases decided in the
Second and Ninth Circuits, which provide the historic backdrop for
these courts' most recent pronouncements.
The Basic Dichotomy
In Fischmann v. Raytheon Mfg. Co.,46 decided in 1951 by the
Second Circuit, the problem regarding the necessity for proving fraud
or scienter in a private action under rule 10b-5 first surfaced. In this
The Second Circuit has consistently held that some form of the traditional scienter requirement is necessary in a lob-5 action. See text accompanying notes 65-100 infra; Bucklo,
Sci enter and Rule lOb-5, supra note 5, at 576-81. Other circuits have used various phraseology in deciding on the issue, which can be interpreted as requiring something less. See,
e.g.: Seventh Circuit-Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 461 F.2d 11 (7th Cir. 1972) (actual
knowledge and bad faith intent to mislead need not be shown); Parrent v. Midwest Rug
Mills, Inc., 455 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1972) (court chose state securities law statute of limitation specifically agreeing with Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir. 1970),
wherein court noted that rule lob-5, like the state blue sky law, does not require proof of
scienter); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963) ("knowledge of the falsity
or misleading character of a statement and a bad faith intent to mislead or misrepresent are
not required to prove a violation of the statute."); Eighth Circuit- Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir. 1970) (in choosing appropriate statute of limitations, court
noted that rule lob-5 did not require proof of scienter); City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom,
422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970) (court disagreed with the
Second Circuit insofar as that court did not accept a negligence test); Myzel v. Fields, 386
F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967) (proof of scienter is not required);Ninth Circuit-Royal Air
Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cit. 1962) (plaintiff will make prima facie
case when he supplies proof of either a material misstatement or an omission of a material
fact); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961) (the statute speaks in terms of "any
manipulative device or contrivance," and there is "no reason to go beyond the plain meaning of the word 'any'"); Tenth Circuit- Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d
90 (10th Cit. 1971) (defendant can avoid liability if he sustains the burden of proving that
he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care would not have known, of the challenged misrepresentations or omissions); Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348 (10th Cir. 1970)
(court used reasonable care standards with regard to knowledge of misrepresentations);
Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cit. 1965) (finding of negligence would be
sufficient).
4 See Bucklo, supra note 5, at 581.
46188

F.2d 783 (2d. Cit. 1951).
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case shareholders had brought suit under section 11 of the Securities
Act of 193347 and rule 10b-5 alleging that they had purchased shares
in reliance upon a prospectus and registration statement, both of
which were later found to contain untrue statements and material
omissions. The district court dismissed the complaint, noting that
rule 10b-5 and section 11 do not necessarily cover the same proscribed conduct. 48 The court concluded that section 11 deals with misleading statements and material omissions in a registration statement, whereas rule 10b-5 proscribes the same conduct but in connection with the purchase or sale of a security. The Second Circuit
reversed, predicated on what they felt was an improper distinction
between section 11 and rule 10b-5 by the district court. The court
stated:
We think that when, to conduct actionable under § 11 of the
1933 Act, there is added the ingredient of fraud, then that
conduct becomes actionable under § 10 (b) of the 1934 Act
and the Rule . . .49
It is evident that the Fischmann court placed an added burden
on a 10b-5 plaintiff through the addition of the "ingredient of
fraud" with which a plaintiff under section 11 did not have to
contend. The reasons for this added burden, however, are not as
explicit, and hence the underlying intent can only be surmised. Quite
possibly the court's rationale is based, to some extent, on the fact
that a private remedy is express in a section 11 action, while merely
implied under rule 10b-5. 50 Whatever the reason, the court seemed
willing to employ the element of fraud to differentiate between the
applicability of the two, yet the court's definition of the term fraud
was noticeably absent from the opinion. 5' One would expect that at
least a suggestion of the court's rationale underlying its proposition
that an action under rule 10b-5 requires proof of fraud might be discernable from the two cases cited in Fischmann.52 Unfortunately,

4715 U.S.C. § 77k (1970).
48
Fischmann v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 9 F.R.D. 707, 709 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). The court held
that relief was not available under § 11 of the 1933 Act, since suit had been brought by
common shareholders, whereas the prospectus was addressed to preferred shareholders.
49
Fischmann v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 786-87 (2d Cir. 1951).
s § 11 of the 1933 Act reads in part:
In case any part of the registration statement . . . contained an untrue statement
of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact required to be stated therein
or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading, any person acquiring
such security . . . may . . . sue ....

Rule lob-5 contains no clause even remotely similar.
51The court, in an illustration designed to buttress its rationale, did imply that the "ingredient of fraud" would consist of action taken knowingly with an intent to defraud. Fischmann v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 787 (2d Cir. 1951).
52Norris & Hirschberg, Inc. v SEC, 177 F.2d 228 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Ward LaFrance Truck
Corp., 13 S.E.C. 372 (1943).
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such is not the case. The only indication of what the court considered to be an accurate definition of the fraud requirement can be
found in the court's acceptance of that portion of the complaint
which alleged scienter54 -"the
defendants knew or should have
known that the statements herein alleged were false and misleading. '55 This language implies that some form of constructive knowl56
edge would have been sufficient to establish the necessary scienter.
And regardless of the court's use of the term "fraud," the distinction between constructive knowledge and the scienter requirement
necessary to impute liability under section 11 is at best a subtle one.Y
Irrespective of this fact, commentators have long considered
Fischmann to be the outer limit in stringency for the scienter requirement,58 a dubious conclusion indicating the difficulties inherent
in any attempt to interpret a court's definition of scienter.
Considered the other extreme in its analysis of the conduct nec59
essary for imposing liability under rule 10b-5 is Ellis v. Carter,
decided in 1961 by the Ninth Circuit. In Ellis, the defendant averred
that under rule 10b-5 the plaintiff must prove "genuine fraud, as
distinct from a mere misstatement or omission." 6 The court, in dismissing this contention, characterized such a burden as
a challenge to the validity of subparagraph (2) of the rule
... predicated on the idea that a proscription of material
misstatements and half truths without using fraud or scienter language is not a permissible implementation of section 10 (b) .61
The court went on to state:
Had Congress intended to limit this authority [to prescribe
regulations] to regulations proscribing common-law fraud,
it would probably have said so.62

3In Norris & Hirschberg, Inc. v. SEC, 177 F.2d 228 (D.C. Cir. 1949), there is no discussion of scienter. In Ward LaFrance Truck Corp., 13 S.E.C. 372 (1943), the Commission
noted that 10b-5 applies to purchases "the same broad antifraud provisions" found in § 17
(a) of the 1933 Act for sales. Ward LaFrance Truck Corp., supra at 381 n. 8.
54See BROMBERG, supra note 8, § 8.4 (506), at 204.109 (1971).
55
Fischmann v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 791 (2d Cir. 1951) (Appendix: ff23).
56

Id.
57§ 11 employs a form of constructive knowledge as a scienter element. See BROMBERG, supra
note 8, §8.4 (320) at 204.18 (1971).
s See Bucklo, supra note 5, at 566; Note, Scienter and Rule 1Ob-5, supra note 13, at 1064;
Note, Scienter in Private Damage Actions Under Rule 10b-5, 57 GEO. L. J. 1108, 1110
(1969).
- 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961).
61Id. at 274.
67Id.
2
6 Id.
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The interpretation given Ellis by the courts and the commentators has ranged from that of strict liability, 63 wherein no form of
scienter need be shown, to negligence" as a standard for determining proscribed conduct under rule 10b-5. Unless one is willing to
accept the constructive knowledge interpretation of the fraud requirement enunciated in Fischmann, each of the interpretations
given the Ellis decision, both of which discard the shackles of the
traditional scienter requirement, is inapposite to the Fischmann
standards. Thus, quite early, the positions the two circuits would take
were decided; the only remaining task lay in the semantic refinement of their theories.
The Second Circuit
Subsequent to Fischmann, the Second Circuit discussed the scienter requirement of rule 10b-5 in a number of cases. Considered
collectively, these cases are ambiguous and confusing, and any attempt to decipher a common meaning of or definition for scienter is
futile. Consequently, they will be dealt with individually.
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,65 decided in 1968, is probably
the single most important decision in the 10b-5 arena. Despite its
importance, however, it succeeded in compounding existing confusion regarding the scienter requirement of the rule. This confusion
stems from the discrepancies within the majority opinion of Judge
Waterman, and from the disparities between the majority opinion
66
and the concurring opinion of Judge Friendly.
Judge Waterman offered substantial commentary on the applicability of good faith as a defense in an action under 10b-5, as
well as a general discussion of the scienter requirement.67 Taken
individually, these comments are readily comprehensible, but taken
as a whole they are somewhat confusing. As a result, it is very dif-

6

See BROMBERG, supra note 8, § 8.9 n. 102.

e.g., City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 442 F.2d 221, 230 n. 9 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
399 U.S. 905 (1970); Note, Proof of Scienter, supra note 13, at 1077.
65401 F.2d 833 (2d Cit. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). A brief outline of the
facts follows: late in 1963, a TGS exploration group completed drilling in an area thought
to contain extensive mineral deposits. The evaluation of the information from this drill hole
was later found to be material information by the Second Circuit. Prior to public disclosure,
several insiders purchased TGS stock. In addition, four days prior to a press conference announcing a substantial ore strike, the company attempted to quiet rumors concerning the
strike via a public statement. The SEC alleged that this statement (April 12 press release)
was misleading and deceptive. The SEC brought suit under rule l0b-5 against both the
TGS insiders and TGS itself. The case has been extensively analyzed by a number of commentators. See Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur-The Second Round: Privity and State of
Mind in Rule 1Ob-5 Purchase and Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 423 (1968); Sandler &
Conwill, Texas Gulf Sulphur; Reform in the Securities Marketplace, 30 OHIO ST. L.J. 225
(1964); Note, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 82 HARV. L. REv. 938 (1969).
16 401 F.2d at 868.
6See,

67

1Id. at 854-55, 862.
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ficult to ascertain exactly what Judge Waterman determined to be
the standard for conduct violative of the rule, and conversely, the
standard for a defense in a 10b-5 action.
The first notable comment by Judge Waterman, that "proof of
a specific intent to defraud is unnecessary, '68 implies that a less
stringent scienter requirement than the Fischmann court's "fraud"
was sufficient. Judge Waterman expanded this concept:
[I] n an enforcement proceeding for equitable or prophylactic
relief, the common law standard of deceptive conduct has
been modified in the interests of broader protection for the
investing public so that negligent insider conduct has become unlawful.69 (Emphasis added)
He then observed that "a similar standard has been adopted in
private actions ....
-70 and supported these conclusions with the statement that the implementation of a negligence standard "comports
with the administrative and the legislative purposes underlying the
Rule. '71 Some attempt was then made to reconcile this rationale with
the language in Fischmann by observing that
some form of the traditional scienter requirement ...
72
times defined as "fraud" . . . is preserved.

some-

In a later discussion on the question of corporate liability for a
misleading press release, Judge Waterman skirted the issue:
IT]he only remedy the Commission seeks against the corporation is an injunction . . .and therefore we do not find
it necessary to decide whether just a lack of due diligence
on the part of TGS, absent a showing of bad faith, would subject the corporation to any liability for damages.7 3
The analysis is puzzling. After having determined that mere
negligence may be sufficient for insider liability, Judge Waterman
then suggested that a "showing of bad faith" coupled with a "lack
of due digilence" may also be required before the imposition of

6 id. at 854.
69

Id. at 854-55.
70Id. at 855. It should be noted that Judge Waterman cited solely non-Second Circuit decisions as support for this statement. It is questionable whether Judge Waterman truly meant
to apply a negligence standard in the Second Circuit, especially in light of the fact that the
basis for his decision was clearly not negligence.
71Id.
72 Id.

7 Id. at 863.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol23/iss3/8

12

1974]

SCIENTER AND RULE lob-5

liability on a corporation.7 4 Thus, another standard borrowed from
the common law appears in a 10b-5 action. The attendant result is
more confusion of the already disconcerting array of standards applicable to a 10b-5 cause of action.
It is interesting to note that, although a discussion of negligence
is usually centered around the defendant's non-discovery of material
facts, Judge Waterman's discussion regarding negligence by insiders
was not concerned with the insiders' negligence in failing to ascertain the necessary information, but rather with their negligence in
75
not disclosing that information to the investing public.
This concern was shared by Judge Friendly in his concurring
opinion in which he agreed with Judge Waterman's results but disagreed with the analysis used to attain them. Judge Friendly was
not convinced that the imposition of liability for damages under
rule 10b-5, without a scienter requirement attendant thereto, would
not surpass the authority vested in the SEC by section 10(b) to
protect the public from "any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance."7 6 This disagreement was further demonstrated by the
following language in his opinion:

74Although Judge Waterman declined to treat the question of negligence with regard to
corporate liability, he did note that:
It seems clear, however, that if corporate management demonstrates that it was
diligent in ascertaining that the information it published was the whole truth and
that such diligently obtained information was disseminated in good faith, Rule
lob-5 would not have been violated. 401 F.2d at 868 n. 4.
It appears that Judge Waterman is again considering a negligence standard with regard to
the scienter requirement.
7' Defendant's knowledge of the drill results was not in dispute. Id. at 852-53. Rather, the
issue centered on whether the defendants had bought Texas Gulf Sulphur (TGS) stock
before the information concernine the ore strike had been sufficiently distributed to the
public, thus their use of a good faith defense to the charge. The court found specifically
that Crawford "sought to and did 'beat the news."' Id. at 853. With regard to Coates and
Clayton, the court felt that any lack of knowledge of the public disclosure was unreasonable,
which in turn can be interpreted as either negligence or recklessness. Clayton had ordered
two hundred shares of stock on the day preceding the public announcement, whereas Coates
had left the April 16 press conference and ordered two thousand shares before the news
could possibly have appeared over the Dow Jones tape. Id. at 847, 854 n. 19.
16Id. at 867-68. Rule lob-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme or artiface to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates as
a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973). Judge Friendly's main concern was with clause (b) of the
rule, which makes no mention of fraud and which he felt was based not on rule lOb-5 but
on § 17(a) (2) of the 1933 Act. Judge Friendly insisted that this section was clearly in(Continued on next page)
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[T] he April 12 press release would be the worst possible
case for the award of damages for merely negligent misstatement as distinguished from the kind of recklessness
that is equivalent to willful fraud ....
Thus, Judge Friendly clearly disagreed with Judge Waterman's view
of negligence as the standard to be used for imposing liability for
damages. However, his reference to "recklessness . . . equivalent to
willful fraud" 78 is little aid in discerning the scienter requirement he
advocated as being necessary. The disagreement surrounding scienter, negligence, and the standards under 10b-5 in the Second Circuit is further exemplified by the fact that two judges specifically
dissented from the results of the case,7 9 while two others agreed with
Judge Friendly's analysis of the scienter issue.80
The problem in the circuit again became apparent in Heit v.
Weitzen,8 1 decided in the same year as TGS. In Heit the court shied
away from the question of negligence liability entirely, stating simply that the complaint was sufficient since besides alleging negligence
it also alleged actual knowledge, and as such the complaint satisfied
the scienter requirement, "whether the scienter test ultimately ap8' 2
plied be strict or liberal.
83
Again in the same year SEC v. Great American Industries, Inc.
was decided. The court there held that the failure of the defendants
to disclose material facts constituted common law fraud. Judge

(Continued from preceding page)
tended by Congress to afford only injunctive relief or in appropriate circumstances, criminal
liability. See H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., ist Sess. 9-10 (1933), cited in, 401 F.2d at
867.
Once it had been established, however, that an aggrieved buyer has a private
action under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, there seemed little practical point
in denying the existence of such a right under Section 17 -with the important
proviso that fraud, as distinct from mere negligence, must be alleged. SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 867 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
976 (1969).
77SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 868 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976
(1969), citing SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 1968).
78Judge Friendly apparently felt that a traditional reading of the scienter requirement was
necessary in a suit for money damages, whereas he was willing to accept Judge Waterman's
negligence standard for injunctive relief where it "can be of such great public benefit and
do so little harm to legitimate activity." 401 F.2d at 868.
71judges Moore and Lumbard dissented entirely from the imposition of liability on the corporation for the misleading press release. Id. at 870.
80judges Kaufman and Anderson. Id. at 869.
"1402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968).
821 d. at 914.
83407 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 920 (1969).
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Friendly commented that the actions of the defendants were not
merely negligent, "but something more. ' 84 In a concurring opinion,
however, Judge Kaufman noted that
Those who buy or sell securities may no longer assume that
the unmended fences of common law fraud will remain the
outer limits of liability under Rule 10b-5 ....
[T]he rule's proscription is . . . "closer to unfairness
than what either lawyers or laymen usually think of as
85
fraud."
Judge Kaufman's statements in his concurring opinion, which implied that the court went beyond what is considered the traditional
scienter requirement in order to render its decision, appeared to be
a misinterpretation of the majority's findings in the case because it
86
is clear from the facts that the omissions were made knowingly.
87
A year later, in Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc., the confusion was not yet resolved. In an action for damages caused by
reliance upon a misleading offering circular, the Second Circuit
affirmed a jury verdict for the plaintiff. In its instructions to the
jury, the court had cautioned that, before the defendants could be
held liable, the jury
must conclude the appellants "knew the statement was misleading or knew of the existnce of facts which, if disclosed,
would have shown it to be misleading." 88
The defendants, however, requested the jury be instructed that in
order to find the defendants liable, the jury must find that the "appellants intended to defraud appellees ..
"..
,89 The court felt this
instruction too strict.

84

8

d. at 458. The actions referred to were the failure of the defendant-seller and finders to
disclose that five-sixths of the consideration received in a sale of property to GAI would
go to persons other than the seller, and statements in press releases and in Form 8-K reports which exaggerated the feasibility of putting a mine into working operation. Id. at 455.

1Id. at 462, citing BROMBERG, supra note 8, § 1.1, at 5 (1971).

86Although GAI was aware that it would not put the mine it had purchased in operation

within 90 days, unless additional investigations showed that it would be warranted, they
nevertheless stated that the mine could be in operation within 90 to 120 days in a press
release. In addition, they repeated this same statement in even stronger terms in an 8-K
report which was filed with the SEC. 407 F.2d 453, 456 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 920 (1969).
87418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cit. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970). Globus involved an
action for damages caused by reliance upon a misleading offering circular. The prospectus
had emphasized a contract between Law Research Service and Sperry Rand Corp., but it
had failed to mention a dispute and a lawsuit between the two corporations.
8Id. at 1290.
89Id.
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In noting that an allegation of actual knowledge of falsity is
sufficient to sustain a claim, the court stated that the "trend is clearly
away from enforcing a scienter requirement equal to the 'intent to
defraud' required in common law fraud." 90 The court further observed that "whatever the outcome of the great debate over ordinary
negligence versus scienter in private actions under 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 .. . it is clear that . . . the instruction satisfied the scienter
requirement imposed by prior cases." 91
In what might seem a complete about-face from the "trend ...
away from enforcing a scienter requirement equal to the 'intent to
defraud' "9 as enunciated in Globus, the Second Circuit in 1971 decided Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co." In affirming the dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint, the court stated:
Thus plaintiffs' claim is nothing more than a gardenvariety customer's suit against a broker for breach of contract, which cannot be bootstrapped into an alleged violation of ... Rule 10b-5 .... 94
The court noted that liability would not be imputed absent a showing
of allegation of facts amounting to scienter, intent to defraud, reckless disregard for the truth, or knowing use of
a device, scheme or artifice to defraud. It is insufficient to
allege mere negligence . . .95
Although Shemtob has been cited primarily as support for the
proposition that mere negligence will not suffice to sustain a 10b-5
action, 96 this reasoning being based on the fact that the case was
decided in a factual situation in which "a judicial choice between
scienter and negligence . . ."97 was required, nevertheless a careful
analysis of the court's holding leads to a different conclusion. In
reality the court simply dismissed the claim for lack of federal jur-

90

1d. at 1291.

91Id.
92Id.

93448 F..2d 442 (2d Cir. 1971). The case arose as a result of Shearson's having failed to
honor an oral contract with the Shemtobs, wherein Shearson had allegedly agreed to lower
the Shemtob's margin requirement to 25% and forbear from liquidating their securities
account held by Shearson until having given them an opportunity to provide additional
capital. 448 F.2d at 444.
94Id. at 445.
95Id.

96See, e.g., Republic Technology Fund, Inc. v. Lionel Corp., 483 F.2d 540, 551 (2d Cir.
1973); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1301 (2d Cit. 1973); Cohen v. Franchard
Corp., 478 F.2d 115, 123 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973); Chris-Craft Indus.,
Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 397 (2d Cir.) (Mansfield dissenting), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973). See also Bucklo, supra note 5, at 563.
97Bucklo, supra note 5, at 563.
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isdiction. The court expressly stated that jurisdiction is acquired
only if the allegations in the complaint indicate that federal jurisdiction has been properly invoked.9 8 In Shemtob, however, the action
was clearly grounded on breach of contract by defendant, and by no
stretch of the imagination could damages be recovered for a violation of 10b-5. Hence, the real issue treated by the court, and the
only material point the case stands for, is that the court will not
accept a 10b-5 cause of action grounded on allegations of misconduct which have absolutely no relationship to conduct proscribed
under the rule.9 9 It should be noted, however, that in discussing the
central issue the court used various catch phrases to define the standards for liability under the rule- catch phrases, which, while they
did somewhat define limits beyond which conduct becomes actionable,
were in no manner satisfactory definitions for standards to determine liability. 100
The Ninth Circuit
0
'
In the Ninth Circuit, soon after the decision in Ellis v. Carter,'
the court again faced the question of the scienter requirement in
02
The complaint alleged that
Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith.1
the defendant, who was the president and founder of a real estate
corporation, induced the plaintiff into purchasing shares of stock
in the corporation via a prospectus in which profits and returns
were estimated - although absent from the prospectus were the cost
of the land the corporation proposed to develop, a $165,000 mortgage on the land, and information regarding the fact that $82,500 of
the mortgage was due in less than five months and the balance due
in seventeen months. 0 3 The court, noting that a prima facie violation of rule 10b-5 existed, reversed a judgment for the plaintiff and
remanded for a hearing on the issues of estoppel, waiver, and laches

"iShemtob

v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442, 445 (2d Cir. 1971).

99

Id. at 445:
These allegations, even when accepted as true and construed liberally and most
favorably to the pleader, amount to a claim that Shearson failed to sell out the
Shemtobs promptly, as stated in Shearson's May 1 telegram . . . and that Shearson eventually sold them out without giving them an opportunity to post additional margin, in breach of the alleged May 4, 1970, oral "novation" or modification of the February 4, 1969, written agreement.
This is not the first attempt to employ the rule to obtain federal court jurisdiction in
actions traditionally deemed breach of contract or corporate mismanagement. The Second
Circuit has expressed its concern over this. See, e.g., Ryan v. J. Walter Co., 453 F.2d 444
(2d Cir. 1971); Fershtman v. Schectman, 450 F.2d 1357 (2d Cir. 1971).
110The court used traditional terminology - "scienter, intent to defraud, reckless disregard for
" 448 F.2d at 445.
the truth ..
101291 F.2d 270 (9th Cit. 1961).
F.2d 210 (9th Cit. 1962).
Id. at 212. Neither was the plaintiff told of the previous corporate president's resignation
just prior to plaintiff's stock purchase, nor of his demand for repayment of a loan to the
corporation and his refusal to accept stock in the corporation as payment.

10 312
13
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resulting from plaintiff's knowledge, or constructive knowledge, two

year prior to the suit, of the misstatements and nondisclosures contained in defendant's prospectus. 104 On the issue of scienter, the
court stated that
rule 10b-5, a proper implementation of section 10(b), only
requires proof of a material misstatement or an omission of
a material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security to make out a prima facie case.105
This language would appear to preclude, much as in Ellis, the necessity for proof of any type of scienter for the imposition of liability
under 10b-5. Alternatively, when considering the court's statement
that "common law fraud need not be alleged or ultimately proven,"' 06
an interpretation can be made which is very similar to the philosophy
of the Second Circuit; i.e., that something less than common law
fraud will suffice. However, the obvious question left unanswered by
the court is exactly which standard it will apply.
In Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 0 7 the final case decided in the

Ninth Circuit prior to White v. Abrams,0 8 the court did little to
dispel the confusion it had created. The case involved a broker-dealer
who was held liable for churning a customer's accounts. The court
held that the "gist of an allegation of churning is fraud in law and
differs from common law fraud [since] [plroof of a specific intent
to defraud is unnecessary."' 0 9 Under the facts of the case the fraud
was evident, hence the court's statement that "proof of a specific
intent to defraud is unnecessary" is essentially unenlightening.
Synthesis
A summation of the various opinions in the two circuits discussed
to this point leads to several conclusions. In the Second Circuit the
standard for liability appears to have fallen somewhere between an
actual showing of an intent to defraud and a showing of mere
negligence. Included within this standard is a reckless disregard for
the truth and a knowing use of a device, scheme or artifice to defraud. Conversely, in the Ninth Circuit the standard used for the
imposition of liability appears to have fallen somewhere between a
form of strict liability, with no scienter requirement, and reckless
disregard for the truth.

1041d. at 213.
105
Id. at 212.
1

61d.

10430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970).
108495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974).
109Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1209 (9th Cir. 1970).
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Of course, the inherent difficulty in analyzing the foregoing decisions is that when different judges employ similar terminology
they often attach varying meanings to their words. Therein lies the
crux of the problem with the term scienter. The result has been that,
until very recently, the pronouncements of different courts on the
scienter requirement have been difficult, if not impossible, to decipher. One authority has even suggested that the single most important step toward clarifying the law of scienter would be to ban
the word entirely. 110 To be sure, this is a radical suggestion; nonetheless, outright dismissal of the suggestion as impractical would be
premature. Moreover, recent cases in the Second and Ninth Circuits
have effectively obviated dependence on the term. However, before
substantiating this statement with an analysis of the most recent decisions, the policy considerations and the legislative intent, behind
the issue of scienter as it applies to rule 10b-5 must be understood.
Legislative Intent and Public Policy
The federal securities laws of 1933 and 1934 were enacted soon
after, and to some degree as a result of, the stock market crash of
1929. They were intended to protect investors through full disclosure
of all pertinent information concerning new stock issues and to generally "ensure the maintenance of fair and honest [securities] markets."1 ' The object was to maintain a high level of integrity in the
market, in such a manner as not to interfere with conformed ethical
business standards, while curbing "unnecessary, unwise and destructive speculation." '1 2 This was accomplished through express injunctive and criminal remedies, and under several sections, express civil
remedies.
Rule 10b-5 is an agency enactment which proscribes certain conduct outlined in section 10(b) of the 1934 Act,1 13 and is necessary
because section 10(b) is not self-implementing. This factor in itself
limits any attempt at comprehending the legislative intent concerning the limits of 10b-5 liability and the elements thereunder. This,
coupled with the fact that private actions for damages under the
rule are not expressly granted, but have been implied only from the
language of the rule by the courts, makes it increasingly difficult to
discern any clear guidelines from the legislative history. If the legislature had intended a civil action under section 10(b) it should have
so stated. Nevertheless, the courts have not been reluctant to imply
a private right of action on the basis that an implication of a private
right does not so much depend on the existence of affirmative con10 BROMBERG, supra note 8.
" 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1970).

" 2 H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934).
11315 U.S.C. § 78i(b) (1970).
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gressional intent as it does on the absence of evidence that Congress
did not so intend.1 14 As a result of this judicial doctrine, however,
any analysis of the legislative intent regarding the elements of 10b-5
is somewhat fictitious. Thus the entire spectrum of securities law
and the underlying intent must be purused with an eye toward the
view stated by the Supreme Court in SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, Inc. :115
Congress intended ... securities legislation "enacted for the
purpose of avoiding frauds" [to be construed] not technically
and restrictively but rather flexibly to effectuate its remedial
116
purposes.
Since nothing in the history and development of rule 10b-5 illuminates the question of what substantive elements must be proven,
other sections of federal securities legislation which are similar to
rule 10b-5 may be helpful in determining its proper interpretation.
Section 9 (a) 117 of the 1934 Act proscribes the same type of conduct contained in 10b-5's prohibition of "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance," but 9(a) has elements of intent,
knowledge and purpose, and section 9(e) 118 limits civil liability for
violation of section 9119 (including section 9(a)) to persons who
willfully violate its proscriptions. It would seem logical, therefore,
that Congress and the SEC wished to go beyond the rather rigid proscriptions found in section 9 (a) by means of rule 10b-5.
In section 17 (a),120 the three operative clauses deal with (1) a
device, scheme or artifice to defraud, (2) material misstatements or
omissions, and (3) any practice which would operate as a fraud or
deceit. This section is phrased virtually the same as rule 10b-5, and
in point of fact the rule was essentially taken directly from it.121
As a result, the scienter requirements are the same as those under
122
rule 10b-5.

114

See Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 360-61 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973). See also Boone v. Baugh, 308 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1962);
Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 307 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1962); Errion v. Connell, 236 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1956).
115 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
116

Id. at 195.

117 15

U.S.C. § 78i(a) (1970).

11815 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1970).
11915 U.S.C. § 78i (1970).
120

15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970).

121See
1

Freeman, Administrative Procedures,22 Bus. Law. 891, 922 (1967).

2See, e.g., Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 787 n. 2 (2d Cir. 1951); Globus

v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 287 F.Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), modified, 418 F.2d 1276
(2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
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Two other sections analogous to rule 10b-5 in which the legislative policy has found expression are sections 11123 and 12(2)124 of
the 1933 Act. Proscribed under section 11 are false and misleading
statements as well as omissions in registration statements, both with
express private remedies.1 25 Both sections 11 and 12(2) have short
statutes of limitations and provisions for posting security for the
protection of the defendant.1 26 Both sections sanction actions instigated only by buyers, not sellers, and under 12(2) there must be
privity between buyer and seller. Furthermore, under 12 (2) reliance
is not a necessary element for a successful cause of action, and in addition, negligent misstatements will suffice to establish culpability.
As has already been noted, these sections give an express civil
remedy, while the 10b-5 civil remedy is implied. Since this has not
concerned the courts, the problem becomes instead: how far should
rule 10b-5 extend; and should it be permitted to nullify the two
sections by giving a plaintiff their benefits without the corresponding restrictions Congress imposed upon their use.
Since section 11 deals only with misstatements or omissions in
registration statements, this problem is limited by the smaller number of situations applicable to its provisions- smaller when compared to the great number of situations in which there can be violations of securities laws beyond the issuance stage.
Section 12(2), however, being broader in scope than section 11,
is cause for greater concern. Section 12(2) applies only to purchasers, and if rule 10b-5 were read in the restrictive manner in
which 12(2) is written, seller-plaintiffs would be affected in an
utterly arbitrary, negative manner. This is, of course, undesirable
since the rule allows either purchasers or sellers to bring suit. Thus,
the courts were faced with the dilemma to either force artificial limitations on the rule, thereby thwarting whatever intent lay behind
Congress' deletion of such limitations in the rule, or to limit the effectiveness of section 12(2) by creating a more attractive alternative
remedy through invocation of rule 10b-5. The courts with singular
127
and
ability have succeeded in ignoring this dilemma to date,
1- 15 U.S.C. §77k (1970).
124 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1970).
11 provides:
[A)ny person acquiring such security . . . may, either at law or in equity, in
any court of competent jurisdiction, sue ....
§ 12(2) provides:
Any person -who . . . shall be liable to the person purchasing such security

125 §

from him....

12 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1970).
127See, e.g., Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F.Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964). Only
two cases stand out as examples wherein the court refused to permit a buyer to sue under
rule 10b-5 because of the express right created in the 1933 Act. See Rosenberg v. Globe
(Continued on next page)
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there can be little doubt that under rule 10b-5 either purchasers or
sellers may sue, with little difference in the elements necessary to
be proven or the remedies available.
However, despite the fact that suit is available, there still exists
the question as to what extent the legislative intent regarding rule
10b-5 should be considered when defining the standards for imposition of liability under the rule. Possibly this can be ascertained
through an analysis of the limits of these standards as reflected in
sections 11 and 12(2). The Second Circuit, in Fischmann v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 12 8 apparently interpreted this dichotomy of legislative intent behind the different sections by limiting 10b-5 to fraud,
while applying section 11 to negligent misrepresentations and omissions. The obvious problem with this approach is that it is difficult,
if not impossible, to ascribe a precise meaning to the term fraud.
The Ninth Circuit opinion in Ellis v. Carter, 29 on the other
hand, while not only showing a willingness to ignore the problems
of express versus implied rights of action, seemed willing to find
1 30
violations for negligence under the rule. Since the White v. Abrams
decision reaffirmed this particular aspect of the Ellis decision, it
seems that some illumination could be cast on the issue of which limitation on liability under the rule is the more realistic in light of the
intent behind the rule.
The Ellis court, instead of defining, or at least differentiating
between, the express civil remedies contained in sections 11 and
12(2) and those implied in rule 10b-5, felt that the beneficial results of its decision, based on the rule, far outweighed the danger of
nullifying section 12(2).131 Ignoring the obvious point that courts
should not permit an implied right of action to become preferred to
an express right of action,132 the court instead gave weight to the
apparently dominant policy of Congress "to provide complete and
effective sanctions, public and private, in respect to duties and obligations imposed under the two acts. 1' 33 Furthermore, no distinction

(Continued from preceding page)
Aircraft Corp., 80 F.Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1948), wherein the court held that plaintiffs
sole remedy was under the 1933 Act, "[n]o other interpretation can avoid making a completely incongruous piece of legislation out of the two statutes in question." Id. at 125.
Accord, Montague v. Electronic Corp. of America, 76 F.Supp. 933 (S.D..N.Y. 1948).
12-188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).
12291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961).
130495 F.2d 724 (9th Cit. 1974).
131 Ellis

v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961).

132See Comment, Negligent Misrepresentations Under Rule

1O-5, supra note 13, at 831.

133Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961).
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was made between buyer and seller, "no reason appearing why Congress would have wanted the procedures [of a buyer as opposed to a
1' 34
seller bringing an action under the rule] to be different.
The approach by the Ellis court, permitting negligence to suffice
in a 10b-5 cause of action, may find Congressional support in section
12 (2). Such a statement as "section 12 (2) suggests that a negligence
standard for securities transactions is most compatible with probable congressional intent,"1 35 while implying a rather omnipotent
knowledge of an intent almost impossible of proof, is nevertheless
not devoid of logic. Congress wished to place the duty of care on
1 36
the party with the greater access to the material information.
The burden of proof was thereby shifted from plaintiff-purchaser to
defendant-seller. This shift is appropos under section 12(2) for,
being part of the 1933 Act and thus concerned with the issuance of
securities, its main concern was protecting investors from sellers
who always had greater access to material information than purchasers. But focusing upon access in a 1934 Act situation is unnecessary once the securities have been issued because subsequent purchasers may well be in a better position to gain access to information
than the sellers.1 37 In such a case it would be inequitable to assume
that the seller has more advantage than the buyer to discover material information. Thus in a 10b-5 action, while the same congressional intent found in section 12 (2) concerning the problem of access
to material information should be of prime importance, the shifting
of the burden of proof necessary in 12(2) is inappropriate due to
the impossibility of making any prior judgments as to who has the
greater access to material information.
By eliminating this automatically shifting burden of proof, while
retaining an attempt to equalize access to information, the congressional intent behind section 12 (2) seems to become embodied in rule
10b-5. The obvious result of an attempt to equalize access to information is to maximize disclosure of information both to shareholders
and to the investment public at large. Such a result is considered to
be a prime consideration of the securities laws in general, and some
courts have suggested that such was the principal intent of Con-

134 1d.
135See Comment, Negligent Misrepresentations Under Rule lOb-5, supra note 13, at 839.
13 See 77 CONG. REc. 2918 (1933) (remarks of Rep. Rayburn):
The purpose of this bill is to place the owners of securities on a parity, so far
as is possible, with the management of the corporations and to place the buyer
on the same plane so far as available information is concerned, with the seller.
137See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969).
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gress. 38 If this is so, it would appear that a standard of liability akin
to that under section 12 (2) might very well be the most acceptable
choice. While sections 9 and 18139 are extremely specialized, dealing
with market manipulation and false statements filed with the SEC,
section 12 (2) is both a general provision and a reasonable one. Acceptance of the premise that the congressional intent of rule 10b-5
is satisfied by employing the standards applicable to section 12(2)
(without the shifting burden of proof employed in a section 12(2)
cause of action) in effect permits negligence to became part of the
scienter requirement.
There are strong arguments, however, against this reasoning.
First, it logically can be argued that the scienter requirement needed
in an implied rule 10b-5 action should be more stringent than that
required in an express section 12 (2) action. 140 Second, it has been
suggested that a scienter requirement which includes negligence for
rule 10b-5 would surpass the express statutory authority granted
1 41
the SEC, in section 10(b), to promulgate rules and regulations.
The rationale behind this argument is that the critical words of
section 10(b), (i.e. "manipulative and deceptive devices or contrivances,") were purposely chosen by Congress to avoid the common law
rules of deceit, but were clear evidence of a congressional intent not
to proscribe merely negligent conduct. The Ninth Circuit, in Ellis v.
Carter, responded to this second argument by reasoning that since
clause (b) of rule 10b-5 requires no scienter on its face, and since
"[i] t would have been difficult [for Congress] to frame the authority to prescribe regulations [under section 10(b)] in broader
terms," 142 the plain meaning of the rule should govern without a
scienter requirement, or at least, with negligence included in this
requirement. 4
The main problem with the Ellis court's approach is the total lack
of concern shown for the extraordinary damages which might result
133See Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,

414 U.S. 910 (1973). The court observed that "a major congressional policy behind the

securities laws in general, and the antifraud provisions in particular, is the protection of
investors who rely on the completeness and accuracy of information made available to
them." Id. at 363. See also BROMBERG, supra note 8, § 7.1, at 142 (1973).
13915 U.S.C. § 78r (1970).
140This follows from the fact that to make it less so creates a more attractive alternative
remedy, and thus effectively nullifies § 12 (2). See 3 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1785
(1961).
141See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 461 F.2d 833, 869 (2d Cit. 1968) (Friendly concurring), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F.
Supp. 757, 772 (D. Colo. 1964).
142Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961).
143Until the decision in White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974), there were uncertainty as to what exactly the Ninth Circuit standard was-either no scienter requirement
in the strict sense, i.e., innocent misrepresentation would violate the rule, or a requirement
which included negligence at the very least.
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from a successful 1Ob-5 action. For this reason strict scienter supporters have argued that the issue of damages and the state of defendant's mind must be considered together.1 4 The plain meaning
of this statement is that there should be some limiting factor on the
imputation of liability, and this factor should be based upon the degree of defendant's intent or knowing culpability. In point of fact,
if 10b-5 awards are granted on the basis of mere negligence by the
defendants, it may very well have a negative impact on the disclosure
of information to the public. It is quite true that investor injury
would be minimized by awarding damages for merely negligent conduct. But at the same time, access to information by these same investors might very well be severely curtailed. Since a duty to disclose
does not exist under all conditions and at every moment in time, and
often only where special relationships exist, the end result might be
that, in the absence of insider trading, a corporation would avoid as
much as possible the disclosure of any information not absolutely
necessary of disclosure to avoid incurring liability. Voicing the fears
of the Texas Gulf Sulphur court, the potential damages would be so
great that corporations might choose "to remain silent and let false
rumors do their work. ' ' 145 The attendant result would be the direct
antithesis of the underlying intent of all securities legislation - i.e.,
encouraging the free flow and mutual access of all material securities
information to investors as well as corporate insiders.
If a negligence standard gives results inapposite of the congressional intent, and the Second and Ninth Circuits are diametrically
opposed on the questions of not only whether to impose a scienter
requirement, but also what that requirement entails, in what manner
can the correct approach be surmised? It is clear that other sections
are of little assistance. It is further clear that the dichotomy of
negligence versus some stricter form of scienter, whether it be intent
to deceive, knowledge, constructive knowledge, or any of the other
standards used by the courts, is based on policy considerations which
can only be accurately measured in the context of factual circumstances, and not in an abstract discussion of congressional intent.
Fortunately, the Second and Ninth Circuits have recently enunciated tests which bear some relationship to the realities of the complexities involved. The two courts at least appear to be retreating
from the pitfalls of scienter terminology, and are proceeding towards, and may already have arrived at, tests which will serve the
purposes of the varied situations covered by rule 10b-5 without
using artificial catchphrases or legal fictions. To accomplish this
44

1

Second Round: Privity and State of Mind in Rule
See Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur-The
1Ob-5 Purchase and Sales Cases, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 423, 427 (1968).

v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 867 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
976 (1969).

145SEC
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the circuits have exchanged the elusive scienter and negligence concepts for more reasonable standards which encompass a duty concept reflecting the factual circumstances of individual cases. The
purpose of the final section of this note will be to explain these
standards, to analyze the cases enunciating them, and to show where
these new standards will take the courts.
Toward the Development of a New Standard
Prior to the cases discussed in this section, the Second and Ninth
Circuits have often been at opposite ends on a continuum defining
standards applicable to rule 10b-5. This has made any attempt to
interpret and define these standards with certainty impossible - until
the courts' most recent pronouncements which shed the shackles of
antiquated and elusive terminology and instead found basis in logical
concepts loose enough to adapt to fluctuating individual factual
circumstances.
The Second Circuit
In a series of three cases, Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Piper
Aircraft Corp.,14 Cohen v. FranchardCorp.,147 and Lanza v. Drexel
& Co., 14 8 the Second Circuit recently developed a new standard for
determining whether conduct is proscribed under rule 10b-5. This
standard can be summarized as follows: Liability will follow when
the plaintiff has shown that the defendant had a duty to disclose
material facts and plaintiff has established that defendant failed to
disclose these materialfacts or misstated or omitted to state material
facts; and defendant either knew the material facts that were misstated or omitted and should have realized their significance, or
failed or refused to ascertainand disclose such facts when they were
readily available to him and he had reasonable grounds to believe
that they existed.
This standard as noted does not exist in any one of the three
aforementioned cases, since it is a reflection of the basic concepts
of the three when taken together. Thus, in order to clearly trace the
evolution of the standard, the cases will be treated individually.
Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp.
Chris-Craft was a landmark case in the development of section
14(e),149 the anti-fraud provision of the Williams Act.1 50 While the
case was decided solely on the basis of section 14 (e), the law applied
146480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
14 478 F.2d 115 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973).
F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973).
149 15 U.S.C. § 78n (e) (1970). The facts of the case were substantially as follows: Chris-Craft
Industries (CCI) had made a cash tender offer to Piper Aircraft Corporation (Piper)
shareholders, to which Piper management was opposed. Piper recommended rejection of the
CCI offer in letters to its shareholders, observing that it was convinced that the offer was
14479

(Continued on next page)
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by the court with respect to the standards for liability is identical

to that under rule 10b-5. The Chris-Craft court felt that section
14(e) is nothing more than a recodification of rule 10b-5 with a
removal of the purchaser-seller limitation which had previously kept
the rule from being applied in tender offer cases.1 51 As such, the
court's holdings on the standards for violations of section 14 (e) can
be properly applied to rule 10b-5 cases.
In Chris-Craft,the court offered, for the first time, some indication of the standards applicable to the conduct which must be shown
on the part of defendants in order to prove a violation of the rule.
Judge Timbers, writing for the court, gave little more than lip service
to the Second Circuit's traditional scienter requirement, noting that
the function of the scienter concept is the confinement of liability "to
those whose conduct has been sufficiently culpable to justify the
penalty sought to be exacted."1 52 Proceeding from that point, the
concept and terminology of scienter were dropped entirely, and Judge
Timbers proceeded to establish a standard composed of duties which
varied based on the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant.
He felt that the first inquiry to be made in assessing a suit for
violation of the rule is what duty should be imposed upon the defendant. He observed that there are instances where there exists an
affirmative duty of disclosure. 15a This concept is not new to the area
of 10b-5 liability. In the past, the courts have deliniated several categories of persons who have an affirmative obligation to disclose material facts under certain circumstances,' 54 resulting from special
relationships between the plaintiff and the defendant. Implied in
(Continued from preceding page)
inadequate. Piper took various other defensive maneuvers, including an attempt at selling
300,000 unissued shares to Grumman Aircraft Company, and eventually settled on supporting a competing offer from Bangor Punta Corporation (BPC). BPC eventually won
the control contest, but CCI sued alleging violations of various securities laws including rule
lOb-5 and section 14(e). The case has been extensively analyzed in student treatments. See
Note, Cash Tender Offers: Judicial Interpretation of Section 14(e), 23 CLEVE. ST. L. REV.
Offeror Entitled
262 (1974); Note, Securities Regulation - Tender Offers -Unsuccessful
to Damages and Injunctive Relief for Injury Caused by Violations of Section 14(e), 51
TEXAS L. REV. 1444 (1973); Note, Tender Offers: The Liberalization of Standing Requirements under Section 14(e), 7. U. SAN. FR. L. REV. (1973); Note, Standing Under
the Williams Act, Section 14(e), 5 U. Toledo L. Rev. 403 (1974).
U°Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Star. 454 (1968), amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m-n (1964) (codified
at 15 U.S.C. §§78m(d)-(e), n(d)-(f) (1970).
Is'
480 F.2d 341, 362. Judge Timbers observed that he deemed "the underlying proscription
of § 14(e) [to be] virtually identical to that of Rule lOb-5 ......
12
d. at 363.
1

S3Id.

1

' Insiders: see, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260 (1st Cir. 1966);
Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 268
F.Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), afJ'd, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), modified, 405 F.2d 215
(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); Ross v. Licht, 263 F.Supp. 395 (S.D.
(Continued on next page)
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Judge Timbers' statement is the fact that it becomes critical under
10b-5 nondisclosure cases to determine exactly what the plaintiffdefendant relationship is, and from that relationship thereby determine the duty imposed. Judge Timbers suggested two of these instances - where one party has greater access to information, and
where a special relationship exists between the party making use of
the information and the party who has knowledge of the information. 155 There are, to be sure, several of these situations. As will be
discussed infra, the Ninth Circuit, in the Abrams decision, listed
various criteria which might be used to determine when such a relationship exists.1 5
Judge Timbers further noted that a party making a representation is required to first ascertain what is material, and then to disclose
fully those material facts about which an investor is uninformed and
which would, in reasonable anticipation, affect his judgment.157 This
is more than just a simple restatement of the law concerning misstatements and omissions under rule 10b-5. Judge Timbers has engrafted on the standard a new tool to be used in restricting liability
under the rule. Prior to Chris-Craft, the courts had not found it
necessary to articulate a standard concerning a defendant's liability
in the situation where he knowingly failed to disclose facts which
were later determined to be material by a court, but which were, in
the reasonable judgment of the defendant at the time of nondisclosure,
determined to be something less than material. However, the time
was apparently ripe for an all-out assault by the judiciary on the
criteria used to determine a violation of rule 10b-5, and Judge Timbers was willing to hoist the standard for the Second Circuit. It should
be noted that Judge Mansfield, in a concurring and dissenting opinion,
did not feel constrained to agree with Judge Timbers on this particular issue. In point of fact, Judge Mansfield disagreed with Judge
Timbers' entire treatment of the standards for a violation of the rule,
feeling that the traditional scienter terminology of the Second Circuit would be better suited as the test. It is interesting to note that

(Continued from preceding page)
N.Y. 1967). Tip pes: see e.g., Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495
F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974); Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1969);
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., supra; Ross v. Licht, 263 F.Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967);
In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). Contra, Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 315 F.Supp. 42 (D. Colo. 1970). Broker-Dealers: see, e.g.,
Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970); Wohl v. Blair & Co., 50
F.R.D. 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). See generally Comment, Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United
States-The Supreme Court Speaks on Rule 1Ob-5, 1973 UTAH L. REV. 119.
155480 F.2d at 363.

"S6See text accompanying note 204 infra. See also Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277,
1320-21 (2d Cir. 1973) (Timbers dissenting). Judge Timbers offered similar criteria upon
which he based his determination of liability, reproduced at text accompanying note 191
infra.
lSS480 F.2d at 363.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol23/iss3/8

28

SCIENTER AND RULE lob-5

1974]

Judge Mansfield termed Timbers' addition of culpability language,
and his qualifications and characterization of the standards for violation of the rule, as "compound[ing] existing confusion as to the
law in the area." 1 n Judge Mansfield differed directly with Timbers'
dual materiality test, and stated in response to this that
the test of materiality which was adopted by this court in
List, Heit and Texas Gulf Sulphur, remains an objective one.
If the corporate officer has knowledge of facts that are material according to that test he cannot in his discretion decide
not to disclose them without facing liability .... 159
It would appear that Judge Mansfield is ignoring a very basic
fact in his opinion- the realities of the market place. It is hardly
equitable to award the huge liabilities which might follow a 10b-5
cause of action on the basis of an objective materiality test to be
applied by a judge in the quiet of his chambers. There must be some
room for a reasonable judgment by the defendant, whether he be a
corporate insider or simply a party selling securities to another. Denying him the exercise of reasonable judgment in determining materiality not only avoids reality, but to some degree contravenes public
policy. True, the objective of the securities laws is to protect the
investor through free flow of, and equal access to, all material information, but it is also in that same investor's interest to have at the
helm of the corporation, in whose securities the investor is dealing,
officers and directors who have a pecuniary interest in that corporation beyond mere salary considerations. If a corporate official purchasing or selling securities cannot depend upon the employment of
his own reasonable judgment in deciding whether a fact should or
should not be disclosed, (i.e., whether it is or is not material), but is
instead subject to a later ruling that his actions were unreasonable,
simply in light of an objective materiality test, many will be wary,
and rightfully so, of owning and trading in securities of their own
corporation. 160 It seems intuitively obvious that public policy is undermined if corporate officials are discouraged from taking a more active
interest in their corporation, an interest which extends to stock
ownership. But this is the ultimate result of employing Judge Mans1
58 Id. at
159

398.

Id. at 399.

160See ABA Comment Letter on Material, non-Public Information BNA 233 SRLR D-1,
D-5 (1974). The authors, E. H. Fleishman and D. S. Ruder note that:
[als a standard to be applied by courts, administrators, counsellors and purchasers and sellers themselves, this "objective" test has suffered from the absence
of any universal measure for gauging....
Nevertheless, the very factors adding uncertainty to this "objective" test
also contribute that degree of flexibility which is a prerequisite to any rule or
principle to be applied to the near-endless variety of business situations in which
securities are brought [sic] and sold. (emphasis added).
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field's criterion. His test would opt for laboratory-like conditions
under which to determine whether there was a violation of the rule,
while Judge Timbers' standard would accept and attempt to deal
with the exigencies of the market place. Judge Timbers' standard is
the more realistic and practical.
Judge Timbers then compared section 11 and rule 10b-5 as they
applied to his standard:
A failure to perform these duties with "due diligence" in
issuing registration materials provides a basis for suit
under § 11 of the 1933 Act . . . . A knowing or reckless
failure to discharge these obligations constitutes sufficiently
culpable conduct to justify a judgment under Rule 10b-5
• . . for damages or other appropriate relief against the
161
wrongdoer.
With these words he seemingly set a standard for rule 10b-5 violations which is different from that of section 11 violations. While the
possible policy reasons behind such a distinction have been stated
earlier, the actual realities of the differentiation are more elusive.
The "due diligence" language of Timbers clearly implies a negligence
standard for section 11 violations. The language - "a knowing or
reckless failure" - just as clearly implies something more for 1Ob-5
violations, but exactly what is unclear.
Judge Timbers offered a further attempt at clarification:
In sum, and put as simply as possible, the standards for
determining liability . . . [are] whether plaintiff has established that defendants (1) knew the material facts that
were misstated or omitted, or (2) failed or refused to ascertain such facts when they were available to him or could
162
have been discovered by him with reasonable effort.
The first problem with this statement is the attempt to state the
standard "as simply as possible," for the concept of what conduct
suffices for violation of the rule is not one that can be stated simply.
The rule is many tentacled and reaches into every aspect of securities dealings, seemingly with very little restriction. For this reason
alone, some authorities feel that a single scienter requirement for all
163
aspects of this rule can never be sufficient.
In one sense this is correct. The requirements of scienter had
previously never really been defined, and if they were narrowed to
a single standard it would never suffice to cover the entire gamut of

161480

F.2d 341, 363.

1621d. at 364.
163Cf. BROMBERG, supra note 8, at § 8.4 (51 3); Mann, supra note 5.
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10b-5 violations. On the other hand, if one is willing to view the
scienter requirement as more than just a simple standard, (i.e., a
continuum of standards which consider various relationships and the
duties that result therefrom), the concept of a single, though complex,
standard may very well be sufficient to define violations of the rule
in all cases.
The second problem with Judge Timbers' statement is the use of
the terminology "reasonable effort." Does reasonable correspond- to
a "reckless failure to discharge these obligations," or is it something
less? It would seem that the concepts of lack of reasonable effort and
reckless failure are hardly synonymous, and yet this is clearly what
Judge Timbers implied. 1 "
Despite these ambiguities, Judge Timbers went far towards
clarifying the 10b-5 elements in Chris-Craft. He dispensed with the
term scienter, and instead, treated a violation of section 14(e), and
consequently rule 10b-5, as resulting from the breach of a duty arising
from the relationship between two parties. This standard was further
clarified and expanded in Cohen v. FranchardCorp.,165 the next case
which considered the issue following Chris-Craft.
Cohen v. FranchardCorp.
Franchardis a particularly interesting case because of its treatment of the question whether negligence or something more is needed
to impute liability under the rule. The issue in this case revolved
around the failure of defendants, promoters of a syndicate, to disclose
material facts of which they were not aware to purchasers of partnerships in the syndicate. At the trial level, the plaintiffs had requested a jury instruction which would have had the effect of holding
defendants liable "for mere negligence in allowing the dissemination
of allegedly false and misleading offering materials."' 1 The trial
court refused this instruction, and the Second Circuit affirmed. In so
doing, the court apparently enunciated a standard which required a
showing of more than mere negligence to find a violation of the rule.
Again, as in the Chris-Craft case, it is difficult to determine
exactly where the court was going. The jury charge which the trial
court had used seemed somewhat harsh:
Guilty knowledge is the key to your decision in this case. The
plaintiffs must establish that the defendant whom you are
considering had knowledge and intended to defraud these
14

Judge Timbers apparently was suggesting that defendant's lack of "reasonable effort" was
a "reckless failure" to discharge his obligations. This analysis does not seem to comport
with traditional tort terminology which would likely consider defendant's actions which
were below a reasonable standard to be negligent
165478 F.2d 115 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973).
16 Id. at 123.
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plaintiffs, or that he acted in reckless disregard for the
truth, or that he knowingly used a device, scheme, or artifice to defraud. 67
Judge Timbers, again writing for the court, interpreted this as
a charge which required a showing of "actual knowledge of falsity or
reckless disregard for the truth. ' 168 Under the facts of this case, the
important phraseology in the charge is "reckless disregard for the
truth." The court's analysis regarding this portion of the charge is
similar, but with an important exception, to that in Chris-Craft.
Judge Timbers noted that the Second Circuit has consistently
refused to hold a private party liable under rule 10b-5 for merely
negligent conduct, and supposedly following the same rationale, he
insisted on the necessity for a showing "that the defendant was to some
extent cognizant of the misstatement or omission."1 69 This latter
comment may very well be the most important statement in the
opinion, when taken together with the following:
The standard for determining liability under Rule 1Ob-5
essentially is whether plaintiff has established that defendant either knew the material facts that were misstated or
omitted and should have realized their significance, or failed
or refused to ascertain and disclose such facts when they
were readily available to him and he had reasonablegrounds
to believe that they existed. 70 (Emphasis added)
Thus, it appears Judge Timbers would find a defendant cognizant
of misstated or omitted facts when he had reasonable grounds to
believe that they existed and they were readily available to him. In
light of this, it is difficult to comprehend the rationale for differentiating between the concepts of mere negligence and reckless disregard
for the truth. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine what practical application to the problem the terms might have, beyond the mere attempt
at conceptualization of the degree of defendant's inaction.171 With
the use of a reasonably prudent man test, the defendant's liability
would rest on whether his belief in a fact's non-existence (or better
stated - whether his belief in the truth of the facts as stated) was
reasonable. Avoiding the pitfalls of terminology, this concept appears
far from the "guilty knowledge" to which the trial court's instruction

1671d.

168Id.
169 Id.
170M.

171The courts, when dealing with rule 10b-5 violations, have never attempted to define the

terms "negligence" or "reckless disregard for the truth," apparently believing that their
common law predecessors had provided them with fundamental doctrine. Unfortunately,
this is not the case. See text accompanying notes 16-43 supra.
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to the jury makes reference, yet the court has merely realigned the
test for constructive knowledge - the test the Second Circuit had
17 2
traditionally used and Judge Mansfield reaffirmed in Chris-Craft
-- with the added stipulation. that the facts must have been readily
available to the defendant. Indeed, the concepts of negligence and
reckless disregard for the truth was never really compatible in a
10b-5 context. A test concerned with the reasonableness of defendant's beliefs fits more easily into the framework of a 10b-5 action.
Without recourse to the negligence-reckless disregard synthesis,
the court differentiated between conduct which is not violative of the
rule and that which is by instituting the "readily available" limitation. The court interpreted the plaintiff's requested instruction as
urging the adoption of a standard under which
failure to discover material facts when such facts could have
been ascertained without inordinate effort is enough to establish a private action under Rule 10b-5, "particularly
where fiduciary relationships require attention."1 73 (Emphasis added)
This standard was refused. Thus, the court would distinguish between
"readily available" and "without inordinate effort" and would attach
liability to the former, but not the latter. Proponents of the old standard might argue that the court has in fact transformed a single question of negligence versus reckless disregard into a dual issue of
reasonableness versus unreasonableness of beliefs, and the degree of
availability of the omitted facts, thereby confusing the issue beyond
necessity.
The counter to this argument is that the sophistication involved
in the operation of the rule, due to its vast coverage, demands a parallel sophistication in the analysis used in assessing individual situations and in determining liability. Indeed, it is only in this manner
that the dissimilar types of conduct and the numerous fact patterns
covered under the rule can adequately be dealt with.
Nevertheless, the court's treatment of the availability concept is
somewhat vague. Judge Timbers made no serious attempt to explain
or distinguish the concepts of "readily available" and "without inordinate efforts."1 74 It is at once apparent that "with inordinate effort"
is at the opposite end of the spectrum from "readily available," but
where does "without inordinate effort" lie on this continuum? Appar-

172Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 398 (2d Cir), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 910 (1973).
173Cohen v. Franchard Corp., 478 F.2d 115, 123 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857
(1973).
In point of fact Judge Timbers did no more than mention the term "without inordinate
?74 Id.
effort," and declined to adopt it as a standard.
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ently Judge Timbers felt that it was a concept broad enough to go
beyond the limited area of "readily available." This interpretation,
when read together with the reasonable beliefs language, and analyzed in light of the court's language with regard to the negligencereckless disregard dichotomy, portends a rather strict reading of the
"readily available" limitation. 175 This is in keeping with the court's
traditional attempts at limiting liability to those whose conduct is
sufficiently culpable.
Although the Franchardcourt did not advert to the theory of a
duty evolving from the relationship of the parties, or that duty's
effect on the standards which it posited, it was unquestionably an
integral part of its reasoning. The court's manner of dealing with the
defendant's conduct, while repeatedly couched in negligence terminology, was partially based on the plaintiff's complete dependence on the
defendant's statements.17 6 The court's finding of no liability might
well have stemmed more from the fact that defendant's conduct was
not even negligent let alone reckless, i.e., defendant did not have reasonable grounds to believe that undisclosed material facts existed.'7
This fact suggests that the court might possibly find negligent actions
on the part of the defendant sufficiently violative of a duty so as to
demand the imputation of liability. The court, however, left the development of this concept of duty to the future.
Lanza v. Drexel and Co.
It was only a fifteen day wait, however, before the Second Circuit continued its assault on the traditional scienter requirement. In
Lanza v. Drexel and Co., 178 the court, sitting en banc, discussed the
concept of duty as it applied to the conduct of an outside director of
BarChris Construction Co. Judge Moore, writing for the court, set
out the issue quite clearly:

175Although

it is not dear, it appears that the actual holding of the court, affirming the jury
verdict of no liability on the part of the defendants, was based on the fact that the court
felt that the defendants did not have reasonable grounds to believe that there existed material information of which they had not informed the plaintiffs. The court noted:
It is not enough for plaintiff to show that defendant failed to detect certain
material facts when he had no reason to suspect their existence.
176 It is self evident that the relationship between plaintiffs and defendants resulted in a duty,
since the rule operates to create a duty in a situation where purchasers of securities must
rely solely on the statements of sellers when engaging in a transaction. In the Franchard
case defendants prepared literature to promote the sale of limited partnership interests in
Associates, and prepared and filed a prospectus with the Attorney General of New York
pursuant to N. Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-e(1) (a), (b) (McKinney 1968). 478 F.2d at
118.
177 478 F.2d at 123.
1n 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cit. 1973) (en banc). The case centered around an exchange of 20,000

shares (all of the outstanding stock) of Victor Billiard Co., owned by the plaintiffs, for
20,428 shares of BarChris Construction Co.. Less than one year after this exchange, BarChris had filed a petition in bankruptcy. After having unsuccessfully attempted to recover
(Continued on next page)
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To what extent does a director of corporation A, (1) who
does not know that officers or directors of the corporation on
whose board he sits have made false representations to, or
have failed to disclose the inaccuracy of material information given to, or have omitted to give material information
to owners of all the shares of corporation B who are exchanging their stock for that of corporation A, and (2) who has
not been a participant in the negotiation of the sale or made
any representation with respect thereof, or had any knowledge thereof, owe a duty to such purchaser, to inquire into
all statements, oral and documentary, made to the stockholders of B in connection with the transaction before voting to
authorize the contract formalizing the sale?179
The district court felt that the circumstances of the case dictated a
conclusion that no duty existed. The court noted:
The claim fails because of two propositions, one of fact,
the second of law:
1). Coleman, [the outside director] neither participated in
nor knew of any deception practiced upon the plaintiffs;
2). in the circumstances disclosed by the record, he was
under no duty to investigate more than he did at the
material times or to seek out and advise the plaintiffs in
any way. 180
The trial court referred to a dual duty, the first being the duty
to discover material facts which had not been related to plaintiffs, the
second being the duty to disclose these facts to the plaintiffs. Judge
duty to
Moore, however, referred to these two duties as one -the
convey. This oversimplification is the first difficulty encountered with
this opinion, which continually refers back to pre-Chris-Craftterminology in assessing the scienter requirement.
The court went through an extensive analysis of the legislative
intent behind the 1933 and 1934 Acts, as well as common law and
public policy considerations, in order to determine that a director of
(Continued from preceding page)
their shares in rescission, the plaintiffs brought an action for compensatory and punitive
damages against former officers and directors of the company. Defendant Coleman, a
partner of defendant Drexel and Company, was a member of the Board of Directors of
BarChris. It was alleged, and later proven at trial, that certain officers and directors of the
company had, by material misstatements and omissions, misled the plaintiffs into exchanging their stock for that of BarChris. Judge Frankel, writing the district court opinion, held
that Coleman, as an outside director of BarChris, was not liable under rule lOb-5, and
that Drexel and Company was not liable under the theory of respondeat superior for the
alleged misconduct of Coleman. This finding was based primarily on the fact that Coleman
had not participated in the negotiations with Victor, and had not been aware of the mis.
representations made to Victor.
l""Id. at 1279.
1I Id. at 1289.
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a corporation is not an insurer of the truth of corporate statements.
But the court also went so far as to say that there is no duty on the
part of a director to convey all material adverse information to prospective purchasers of a company's stock. 181 This statement is, quite
obviously, misleading. Judge Moore surely did not mean that a director, aware that material facts were kept hidden from prospective
purchasers, would not be under a duty to disclose these facts. Rather,
it would appear that he was referring to a situation wherein the
director is either unaware of such facts and is under no duty to discover them, or is unaware of the failure to communicate such facts
82
to prospective purchasers.
Judge Moore noted that proof of willful or reckless disregard for
the truth is necessary to establish a violation of the rule. He further
observed that in determining what constitutes such willful or reckless disregard
the inquiry normally will be to determine whether the defendants knew the material facts misstated or omitted, or
failed or refused, after being put on notice of a possible
material failure of disclosure, to apprise themselves of the
facts where they could have done so without any extraordi1 83
nary effort.
Unfortunately, Judge Moore failed to further explain and utilize
this standard in assessing the defendant's conduct, but simply noted
that Coleman had not "willfully closed his eyes or turned his back on
the fraudulent nature of the . . .negotiations."'8 This type of cursory analysis is one of the major failings of the opinion, for it is
of little assistance in establishing workable standards to quote the
Chris-Craftstandards and then refuse to apply them.
The court's reference to willful or reckless disregard for the
truth is a traditional Second Circuit standard, long considered the
mainstay as a limit for the imputation of liability.1 85 It is not sufficient, however, to circumscribe the area beyond which conduct will
not violate the rule; rather, what is needed is an in-depth analysis of
the duties and standards of conduct which must be maintained by
those in a position to effect investor injury, together with a system
181Id.
182There

is no question, as the court notes, that a director is not an insurer of the truth of
corporate statements. Id. But, there are situations wherein a director, exercising reasonable
judgment, should be aware that either naturally adverse facts concerning the corporation
are being concealed from him, or that it is likely that such facts of which he is aware are
not being disclosed to parties, to whom, due to the circumstances, the corporation lawfully
must disclose. See 479 F.2d at 1321 (Timbers dissenting).
18Id. at 1306 n. 98.
84

Id. at 1306.
1eSSee, e.g., Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 363 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
1
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of tests designed to detect both breaches of those duties and conduct
falling below the standard. Judge Timbers, in Chris-Craft and Franchard, developed a series of tests for this very purpose, leaving only
the decision of what variables need be applied to the duty or standard
of conduct applicable to a given individual to the inclination of the
future courts dealing with a specific fact pattern.
Although the Lanza court did not fail to enumerate a number of
considerations needed in determining the duty to be applied to an
individual (in this case, an outside director), once having done so
the court's treatment of his conduct in relation to the standards developed by Judge Timbers is disenheartening.
The dissenting opinions of Judge Hays and Judge Timbers illustrate some of the problems ignored in the majority opinion. Judge
Hays' appraisal of the majority's treatment of the defendant's conduct is succinct and direct:
It is not profitable in considering a case such as this merely
to characterize the allegedly unlawful conduct as either negligent or willful and to impose liability only if the conduct
was willful. Neither the Act nor the Rule creates such a
186
simple dichotomy.
Rather than phrasing Coleman's duty to the plaintiffs as one
which does not include a duty to investigate further than he did, Hays
simply maintained that the director of a corporation that is selling
purchasers
its shares has an obligation (or duty) "not to defraud the
187
'
by either misstating or omitting to state material facts.
Although Hays did not phrase his analysis in the terms used in
the Chris-Craft-Franchardstandards, his analysis is analogous. He
noted that despite Coleman's position, experience and knowledge of
the corporation's internal strife, he made no attempt to inquire concerning the course of the negotiations. This analysis is quite acceptable when the Chris-Craft-Franchardvernacular is applied, i.e., he
failed to ascertain such facts when they were readily available to him.
The important question, which Judge Hays raised in traditional
negligence terminology, and which the majority opinion ignored altogether, is whether Coleman had reasonable grounds to believe that
the plaintiffs had not been given all the facts. Judge Timbers based

186479 F.2d at 1317. It appears that the majority's treatment of the problem in this manner

has already had an affect. See Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,574 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). The district court in citing Lanza noted that
the plaintiff must prove that defendant had actual knowledge of any misrepresentations or
omission or that his "failure to discover the misrepresentations and omissions amounted to
a willful, deliberate, or reckless disregard for the truth that is the equivalent of knowledge."
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ff 94,574, at 96,002.
F.2d at 1317.

187479
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his analysis on a reckless disregard for the truth standard, and
thereby imputed liability. 188 Judge Hays predicated his finding that
Coleman had failed to determine that the condition of the company
had worsened considerably since the outset of the negotiations, along
with his subsequent failure to disclose this fact on negligence.1 89
It is unfortunate that neither the majority nor the two dissenting judges stated their conclusions in language more amenable to
analysis. As has been stated previously, the terminology of negligence
and reckless disregard for the truth is difficult to analyze since their
use is influenced by a number of variables applicable to each individual factual pattern. Both dissenting judges apparently determined
that Coleman did not have reasonable grounds for believing that the
deteriorated condition of the company had been related to Victor.
If, rather than couching their analysis in negligence-reckless disregard terminology, the court and the dissenters had clearly set out the
circumstances and relationships which influenced their decision regarding the reasonableness of Coleman's beliefs, subsequent courts
would have been better served.
Judge Timbers somewhat approached this point in his analysis
by setting out what he considered to be points which demonstrated
Coleman's reckless conduct:
1. Coleman was the most experienced member of the Board
with regard to financial and business matters, having been added
at the behest of Drexel to protect their substantial interests in
BarChris.
2. He was aware that BarChris was acquiring Victor through
an exchange of stock, since he had voted for the acquisition.
3. He was aware of the business reversals BarChris had suffered
and the severe internal dissension, yet he was unaware of whether
this had been disclosed to Victor.
4. Coleman's experience should have told him that since neither
the Board nor management would admit to themselves that they had
serious problems until the "point of crisis" meeting, management
had obviously not revealed these problems to outsiders such as Victor.
5. The very nature of BarChris' internal strife should have
caused Coleman to suspect that it had not been related to Victor.
6. Intracorporate dissension is a matter which management typically considers to be within the confidence of the corporation. Those

18 Id. at 1321.
189 Id.

at 1318.
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concerned usually experience an optimism that the problem is not as
serious as it seems. Thus, there was good reason to suspect that the
management of BarChris had not informed Victor of the problem. 190
Timbers' conclusion that Coleman's conduct amounted to reckless disregard for the truth goes further than Hays' finding that
Coleman's conduct amounted to negligence. This in turn goes further
than the conclusion of the majority that Coleman's conduct was
within the limitations of, and met the responsibility imposed by,
rule 10b-5.
The basic observations of the court are twofold:
First, the workings of the rule and the circumstances and relationships involved between plaintiff, defendant and the various intermediate parties impose a duty or standard of care upon the defendant; and it is only a breach of this duty or conduct below the requisite
standard which will cause liability to be imposed.
Second, under the facts of this case, the issue revolved around
the reasonableness of defendant's belief that Victor had been informed of the problems which BarChris was currently experiencing.
A majority of the court (5 judges) felt that these beliefs were reasonable, 191 whereas a minority (4 judges) felt that they were not. 192
Admittedly, Lanza is difficult to analyze in a framework consisting also of Chris-Craft and Franchard.The standards for liability
were poorly articulated, then casually overlooked, as the court lapsed
into traditional scienter terminology. Nevertheless, the opinion is
important for its formulation of the duty analysis ostensibly used in
determining conduct for which the defendant is responsible. By looking beyond the express language of the court and examining the
reasoning of the various judges in light of Chris-Craftand Franchard,
a valuable addition to the new standard is discernable in its nascent
stage.
Summary
The Second Circuit in a series of three cases has begun developing a new standard for the imputation of liability under rule 10b-5.
The court enunciated a series of tests whereby a decision is predicated
on the individual circumstances and relationships involved in a particular case as applied to the conduct of the defendant. The first two
cases laid down the framework for the analysis under the new
standard, while the third case offered the court an opportunity to
9

Id. at 1320-21.
191
Judges Moore, Kaufman, Feinberg, Mansfield and Mulligan.
192
Judge Hays wrote a separate concurring and dissenting opinion, in which he disagreed with
the majority's conclusion on the issue of defendant's liability. 479 F.2d at 1311. Judges
Smith and Oakes joined in Judge Hays' opinion and Judge Timbers joined in Judge Hays'
opinion and wrote a separate concurring and dissenting opinion, in which he disagreed
with the results. 479 F.2d at 1320.
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examine the negligence issue in light of this new standard. Although
the court chose to remain with its traditional viewpoint of not permitting liability for mere negligence, this decision is not too surprising; but it is enlightening when it is considered that the court will
most likely implement this rationale through its "readily available"
and "reasonable grounds" limitations. If such is the case, then it is
to be hoped that the "negligence-reckless disregard for the truth"
dichotomy will disappear in the interpretations.
The Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit, in White v. Abrams,193 while omitting the
detail that Judge Timbers employed in Chris-Craft and Franchard,
developed a standard similar to that of the Second Circuit. Procedurally, Abrams arose on appeal from a lower court verdict, rendered
for the plaintiff, which awarded substantial damages for violations
of rules 10b-5.194 Defendant's contention was that the jury instruction on the question of material misrepresentations was erroneous
and improper:
If you find that defendant made a material misrepresentation to plaintiffs in connection with the sale to plaintiffs of
a promissory note or a share of stock, the law is that defendant has violated the Federal securities laws even if you
find that defendant did not know the falsity of the misrepresentation he made to plaintiffs.1 95 (Emphasis added by circuit court)
The court found that this instruction was too stringent, basing
its decision on the rationale that the lower court's instruction would,
in effect, impose upon Abrams a duty to insure the truthfulness of
his representations.
In reversing and remanding, the court noted that nowhere is
there any indication that Congress or the SEC intended to make anyone an "insurer against false or misleading statements made nonnegligently or in good faith" under section 10 (b) or rule lb'-5.196
193.495

F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974).

194The facts of the case are substantially as follows: Abrams was in the business of soliciting

loans from private lenders for the Richmond Corporations. White and various other plaintiffs made loans through Abrams to Richmond Corporation from 1959 to 1967, and had
purchased their stock in the combined sum of $715,000.00. In 1969, the Richmond Corporation declared bankruptcy with outstanding loans of approximately $58,000,000. In the
complaint White alleged that Abrams misrepresented (1) that he had investigated Richmond (who primarily owned and controlled the Richmond Corporation), and his corporations and found them to be financially sound, (2) that Richmond would use the borro ed
money to purchase equipment for and upgrade the corporation, and (3) that Richmond
had high earnings and could well afford the high interest rates (12-14%). In addition
the complaint alleged that Abrams failed to disclose (1) that he was receiving a large
commission on each investment made through him, and (2) that he sold similar securities
and loans to other persons at higher rates of return (up to 80%). The jury found for
plaintiffs in the sum of $1,101,982.00 which was reduced by the court to $867,200.00.
Defendant appealed. 495 F.2d at 726-28.
Id.at 728.
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The court further indicated that much criticism and speculation
had arisen over its prior opinions in Ellis v. Carter 97 and Royal Air
Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 198 because of its apparent imposition of
absolute liability. 199 Any such interpretation was dismissed and the
court, instead, introduced what it termed its "flexible duty" standard.
The recent Supreme Court decision in Affiliated Ute Citizens v.
United States200 was extensively cited by the court for its treatment
of 10b-5 violations in the context of the duty the rule imposes, rather
than in terms of the elements of common law fraud. The court
noted that
[a]lthough the elements of common law fraud were important in defining what factors should be considered, they were
neither limits nor barriers to the extent of the defendant's
201
duty under the rule.
The Abrams court adopted this approach, concluding that the
correct procedure is "to examine the totality of the factual context
' 20 2
and measure it by the duty imposed on the defendant.
In considering this approach, the court made reference to the
Second Circuit's adoption of a similar methodology for determining
a violation of the rule found in the Chris-Craftand Lanza decisions.
It differentiated between the approach taken by the Second Circuit
and its own by the former's refusal to include negligence within the
scope of conduct proscribed under the rule, as opposed to its own
treatment of negligence as sufficient to impute liability. The court
paid particular attention to Judge Hays' dissent in Lanza which, it
observed, also adopted a duty approach, albeit without the inclusion
of the limitation disallowing liability for negligence.
The court felt that the varied applicability of the rule necessitated a departure from the rigid standards of common law scienter
and demanded instead a flexible approach. The proper analysis, as
the court saw it, is to focus on the duty of the defendant, while permitting the application of a flexible standard to meet varying factual
contexts.

"I Id. The court noted that the "purpose of rule lOb-5 is to qualify the rule of caveat emptor
not to establish a scheme of investors insurance," citing List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340
F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
197291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961).
312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962).
1"White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974). See note 5 supra.
200406 U.S. 128 (1972).
201White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974).
202The court noted:

[A) proper analysis of 10b-5 liability . . . is not based upon . .. convenient,
differently interpreted, shorthand latin phrases behind which one can sweep
complex determinations. 495 F.2d at 732.
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The court was adament in its rejection of the scienter standard
as well as scienter terminology. It felt that the concepts of negligence
and scienter which focus "solely upon state of mind and its various
compartmentalizations" are anomalous in a 10b-5 context, 2 3 and also
noted that Ellis and Royal Air Properties were never intended to
focus on state of mind concepts in treating liability under 10b-5.
In enunciating its flexible duty standard, the court was cognizant
of the fact that in order to make such a standard applicable to each
specific situation, some guidelines must be given to be considered in
determining the duty to which the defendant is to be held. The court
felt that at the very minimum the following factors should be examined: (1) The relationship of the defendant to the plaintiff ;204 (2) The
defendant's access to the information as compared to the plaintiff's
access;205 (3) The benefit that the defendant derives from the relationship;206 (4) The defendant's awareness of the plaintiff's reliance
upon their relationship in making his investment decisions;207 and
(5) The defendant's activity in initiating the securities transaction
20 8
in question.
Although mention of these considerations is helpful in establishing a duty, the court seems to have neglected to formulate any
real standards that can be applied to the facts of a specific instance.
This may very well be exactly what the court intended, enunciating
no explicit standard, but letting a court-imposed duty derived from

"3

Id. at 734.

204Id. at 735. As noted by the court, several cases have considered this relationship. See, e.g.,

Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967)
(action by one class of shareholders against another for approval of unfair merger); Ellis
v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961) (action against fellow members of a joint venture
formed to acquire control of corporation). Cf. Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co.,
259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966) (motion to dismiss denied), 286 F. Supp. 702 (N.D.
Ind. 1968) (on merits), aff'd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989
(1970) ("duties are often found to arise in the face of special relationships").
205495 F.2d at 735. The issue of access to information runs continually through the cases in
which the courts have dealt with insiders, tippees and broker-dealers. See, e.g., Shapiro v.
Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974) (tippees); SEC
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969)
(insiders); Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970). See generally
Comment, Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States-The Supreme Court Speaks on Rule
lOb-5, 1973 UTAH L. REV. 119.
206495 F.2d at 735. See Buttrey v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d
135, 144 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969); Brennan v. Midwestern United
Life Ins. Co., 286 F.Supp. 702, 715-16 (N.D. Ind. 1968), aff'd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970).
207495 F.2d at 735-36. The court cites Drake v. Thor Power Tool Co., 282 F.Supp. 94 (N.D.
Ill. 1967), as impliedly suggesting that the defendants should be held to a high standard
because of their awareness of the fact that the investing public would rely upon the accuracy of their statements.
205495 F.2d at 735-36. See Ruchle v. Roto American Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964)
(liability of director who had taken active part in issuance of new shares to perpetuate
Board's control); Globus, Inc. v. Jaroff, 266 F.Supp. 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (directors actively participated in plan to issue new stock that would have benefited them).
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the rule govern all conduct under the rule. To be sure, this will accomplish what the court intended. The question which must be raised,
however, is whether the court has gone too far.
Judge Wallace noted:
Where the defendant derives great benefit from a relationship of extreme trust and confidence with the plaintiff, the
defendant knowing that plaintiff completely relies upon
him for information to which he had ready access, but to
which plaintiff had no access, the law imposes a duty upon
the defendant to use extreme care in assuring that all material information is accurate and disclosed. If the defendant
has breached this duty, he is liable under rule 10b-5 .... 209
Obviously, there are no limiting factors in this standard.2 10 The
court is willing to impose rather rigid requirements where the circumstances warrant. The court contrasted this situation with those
circumstances wherein the relationship between the plaintiff and the
defendant was so casual that a reasonably prudent person would not
rely upon it in making investment decisions. In such a case, Judge
Wallace felt that only intentional misrepresentation need be avoided
for an individual to remain outside the play of the rule.
The problem with this treatment of the standard is that both
examples are of situations in which even the most stringent court
would most likely find similar results. The real difficulty with the
standard will arise when the solutions are not so clear-cut.
Nonetheless, the Abrams court has established a rather unique
standard for liability under the rule, and has gone to great lengths
to explain the underlying concept. The standard does away with the
state of mind concepts of scienter and negligence and, in their stead,
treats the duty resulting from the operation of the rule, and the
relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant, as the meaningful element in the application of the rule. For this reason alone,
the Abrams decision will do much to eradicate the confusion surrounding the standards for violations of the rule.
The questionable aspect of the decision is the court's failure to
place any limiting factors on the imputation of liability under the
rule. This omission is in sharp contrast to the dual limitation system
of the Second Circuit.

209495

F.2d at 736.

210This statement is somewhat misleading. Professor Bromberg has noted that there are, besides some form of scienter, still some limits on the use of the rule: (1) materiality, (2)
the requirement that there be a security, (3) the requirement of causation, and (4) for
non-privity defendants, the requirement of some degree of participation, aiding-abetting, or
conspiracy. Bromberg, Are There Limits to Rule lOb-5?, 29 Bus. LAW. 167,167-68 (1974).
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The Concept of Duty to Disclose
At this time, a reiteration and comparison of the recent standards
the two circuit courts have espoused would be beneficial.
The Ninth Circuit's standard balances both the duty arising from
the operation of the rule and the relationship between the plaintiff
and the defendant against the conduct of the defendant. A violation
of rule 10b-5 exists whenever the defendant, through his substandard
conduct, has breached this duty.
The Second Circuit's similar, but much more complex standard,
also acknowledges both the duty arising from the operation of the
rule and the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant, and
contrasts these with the conduct of the defendant. But two very important limitations are placed on the imputation of liability. In failing
to discover and disclose material facts, liability will follow only where
the facts were readily available to the defendant and he had reasonable grounds to believe that they existed.
It is obvious that under either standard the only meaningful
variable is the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant.
In the Ninth Circuit's standard, this relationship is directly reflected
in the duty imposed upon the defendant; whereas in the Second Circuit, the relationship will be reflected not only in this duty, but also
in the interpretation of "readily available" information and the "reasonable grounds" standard for believing the information exists.
Questions naturally arise as to what differences will result if the
two standards are applied in the same factual context, and specifically, what considerations will be used to determine the standard of
conduct which the defendant must maintain in order to avoid liability
under the rule.
Another look at the Second Circuit cases may yield some clue. In
Lanza, the Second Circuit employed the limitations on its duty concept to avoid imputing liability to the defendant. The court determined that while a duty existed, it was not one which required a
stringent standard of conduct; and thus defendant's conduct was not
such as to violate the standard or to breach the duty. The Ninth Circuit, viewing the same case,might very well have come to a different
conclusion, and as a result would have found the defendant more
culpable. This would seemingly follow from the court's desire to include negligence within the conduct prohibited by the rule, and its
analysis of the defendant's access to material information, as compared to the plaintiff's access, would have led it to conclude that a
duty existed and defendant's conduct was such as to violate that duty.
The Second Circuit's treatment of the issue in Lanza is comparable to its treatment in Franchard,wherein the court again utilized
its delimiting factors to avoid imputing liability to the defendants.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol23/iss3/8

44

1974]

SCIENTER AND RULE lob-5

Here the Ninth Circuit might well agree with the analysis of the case.
The Second Circuit spoke in terms of facts not "readily available" to
the defendant and lack of "reasonable grounds" to believe that those
facts existed. The Ninth Circuit would likely have found that, while
a duty existed, the conduct of the defendants simply did not fall below
the requisite standard and thus did not breach the duty.
The foregoing suggests that perhaps the courts will ultimately
use a similar analysis in treating fact situations wherein a duty has
been established, and the dichotomy between the two courts may be
determined and possibly resolved by the manner in which the Second
Circuit applies its two delimiting factors. The concept of a duty to
disclose in a 10b-5 context is not really new to the courts, although
the situations employing it are somewhat narrow when compared to
the overall scope of the rule.2 11 Expanding this concept will probably
lead to discrepancies between the two courts based on their individual
views as to what degree of conduct should be governed under the
rule. Irrespective of this fact, a great deal of difficulty should not be
expected in dealing with these concepts in the future.
What can be expected is that the Ninth Circuit, and perhaps
several others taking their cue from that court, will begin to deal
with what has been known as the scienter element with much less
difficulty than in the past. The concept of a breach of duty lends itself
with ease to consideration in a 10b-5 context. The confusing Latin
terminology which, as the Abrams court noted, tends to obfuscate
the rule should no longer be a consideration.2 12 Of course, the Ninth
Circuit will continue its attempt to extend the coverage of the rule
to negligence situations. But it is quite possible that the standards
which the Second Circuit can now begin applying will accomplish
much the same result.
Conclusion
It may well be that the four cases dealt with herein have signalled
the end of an era. The traditional treatment of a 10b-5 violation in
terms of the common law concept of scienter has proven cumbersome
and confusing. The courts and commentators, when dealing with
scienter in a common law context, have had extreme difficulty in
defining the term and, in point of fact, a rational analysis of the

21
212

See cases cited in note 154 supra.
Perhaps this is more of a hope than a fact. The only case that the Second Circuit has handed
down since Lanza, discussing the scienter issue, does not follow the duty concept of analysis
or the standards set down in Chris-Craft and Franchard.Republic Technology Fund, Inc. v.
Lionel Corp., 483 F.2d 540, 551 (2d Cir. 1973) ("something short of specific intent to
defraud is required and something more than 'mere' negligence"). See also Republic Technology Fund, Inc. v. Lionel Corp., supra at 553 (Mulligan concurring) ("proof of a willful or reckless disregard for the truth"); Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. f 94,576 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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common law courts' interpretations of the scienter element forces
the conclusion that the term became literally a catch-all for various
theories upon which the courts wished to base liability.
A purview of 10b-5 cases which purport to analyze the scienter
concept evidences the complete state of confusion resulting from attempts to define the term. The courts' definitions have varied from
action encompassing fraud, intent to defraud, and reckless disregard
for the truth up to and including negligence. Such a wide divergence
has made a rational appoach impossible, forcing the courts to rely
on antiquated catchwords to determine culpability.
In addition, as a result of the use of scienter terminology, the
courts have been unable to adequately define holdings which, in some
cases, purportedly found basis in the defendant's negligent action,
and in some cases rested on a stricted requirement, i.e., something
more than negligence, prior to the imposition of liability. This difficulty, in combination with an inability on the part of the courts to
interpret the congressional intent behind section 10(b), led to overwhelming confusion with regard to the limits to which rule lob-5
extended.
But a new chapter looms. The Second and Ninth Circuits have
finally enunciated standards which can be systematically applied to
a variety of factual circumstances in a manner lending itself to analysis. Through the use of a duty standard, the two courts have presented a methodology for approaching 10b-5 suits which may offer a
solution to their increasingly apparent disparity in attitude toward,
and application of, the rule. It is to be hoped that the two courts
continue to refine and rely on this approach, and that other courts
when faced with 10b-5 cases will, in turn, adopt it.
Alan J. Ross
James F. Soaller
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